Self-dependence vital for Asean states in relations with China

THE conduct of foreign relations by South-east Asian countries - the so-called "small state diplomacy" - has the potential to develop new assertiveness, as the United States withdraws from global free trade and alliances, leaving the space wide open for domination by China.

Some South-east Asian countries are not behaving like typical small states: They do not accept the conventional wisdom that diplomacy is all about relations between big powers and that the small countries have no role.

Small states need not accept the conventional wisdom. They can adopt at least three approaches in their foreign relations: self-dependence, "balancing" and "bandwagoning". All three can be practised simultaneously, and they are not mutually exclusive.

In order to "balance" against external threats, small states form alliances. Or they "bandwagon", or align, with a threatening country to reduce the threat.

For instance, Cambodia and the Philippines are abandoning even the facade of balancing their relations with the US and China, and they have openly bandwagoned with China. Bandwagoning allows them to engage bigger powers to maximise their own economic and political interests.

BUCK-PASSING

There are offshoot approaches. Many small- and medium-size countries in Asia and Europe have sought to prevent the rise of China, seeing it as a domineering hegemon. Not only have they tried to balance Beijing against the US, but they have also adopted a strategy of "buck-passing".

In this approach, these countries avoid taking action to prevent China's rise, and they pass the buck of responsibility to another country.

Under threat, the small states can pass the buck in three ways. First, they can improve diplomatic relations with an aggressor by diverting its attention to the state that catches the buck. Second, they can maintain cordial, but not very close, relations with the buck-catching state while attempting to improve relations with the aggressor. Third, they can build up their military to deter the aggressor while drawing its attention towards the buck-catcher.

The buck-passing small states can also resort to "bloodletting" by prolonging the cost and duration of a conflict in order to increase their own power.

In a comparison of the diplomacy of Singapore and Switzerland, Yvonne Guo and JJ Woo argued that balancing offers flexibility and dynamism, as a small state is able to maintain equilibrium. The authors of the book Singapore And Switzerland: Secrets To Small State Success explained in an article that neutrality is a restrictive stance that forces a small state into a fixed position, aloof from alliances, and into passivity.

There are strategic partners, and then there are "strategic pawns". Small states practise "hedge diplomacy" by befriending major powers without being committed to any of them. By hedging, they escape becoming strategic pawns of bigger powers, while gaining from the rivalry between great powers in the areas of economy and world politics.

The diplomacy of Malaysia towards China has evolved from hedging to emerging economic dependence. Joseph Chinyong Liow, dean and professor of Comparative and International Politics at the S Rajaratnam School of International Studies, argued that hedge diplomacy was Malaysia's emerging strategy towards China. But now Malaysia is being openly courted by massive Chinese investments that it relies upon.

Asean states were compelled to hedge in the face of a rising China, said Cheng-Chwee Kuik, associate professor at the Strategic Studies and International Relations Program at the National University of Malaysia.

Most of them have not wholeheartedly jumped onto Beijing's bandwagon, even as they seek to maximise the profits from their engagement while trying to avoid becoming subordinate to China.

Asean countries' policies towards China are therefore neither pure balancing nor pure bandwagoning.

Here's the contradiction.

On the one hand, Asean states have practised three approaches of "maximising returns" in their relationship with China: economic pragmatism to increase gains, "binding engagement" by dealing with China through multilateral bodies to push Beijing to adhere to the status quo, and limited bandwagoning to profit without accepting subordinate status.

On the other hand, Asean states have also adopted "risk contingency" approaches through hedging economically, politically and militarily. They have sought economic diversification to avoid falling into dependency. They have pursued "dominance denial" to prevent China from becoming a hegemon by encouraging a balance of influence among the bigger powers. They have tried "indirect balancing" by developing their own militaries without targeting a specific country.

In good times, the smaller states moved closer to the Chinese hegemon to draw benefits, but they have also kept some distance from it and selectively displayed defiance.

A small state may employ a policy of "chain-ganging" when it perceives that its own security is linked to the security of an alliance partner. It chains itself by regarding an attack on its ally as an attack on itself. It could drag its chained partner into a war that the partner does not wish to fight.

CHINESE INFLUENCE

But in Thailand, Chinese influence runs deep. Bangkok did not offer genuine support to former US president Barack Obama's pivot to Asia policy, believing it was aimed at containing China.

Thailand's military junta has shifted the country even closer towards China, while US-Thai relations have worsened since the military coup in 2014, with the US warning that a civilian government must be installed for relations to be normalised.

Myanmar's military junta had bandwagoned with China for the sake of regime survival through the 1980s, but is now cautious about the Chinese threat. It is trying to widen its relations with the US, India, Russia and Asean to reduce its overdependence on China. Now, Beijing is worried that its economic interests in Myanmar could be damaged and that Yangon may participate in a strategy of "encircling" China.

Small states desire a peaceful and predictable world order underwritten by security guarantees of powerful countries and multilateral organisations. The world they seek to create is open to free trade, without visible or invisible barriers.

The outdated way of measuring a small state by its population and geographical size, and limited natural resources is being replaced by a more dynamic yardstick of its economic size, international ambitions, domestic stability, military capability and foreign policy consensus.

By that count, the small and economically dynamic states of South-east Asia do matter. Their voice is authoritative both individually and collectively.