Behind the numbers: Navigating banking processes to avert scams can be frustrating

IN THE first half of 2024, Singapore witnessed 26,587 scam cases – a 16.3 per cent increase from the same period last year – with losses rising by 24.6 per cent to an estimated S$385.6 million​.

Among the most lucrative for scammers were government official impersonation scams, which caused the highest average losses at over S$116,000 per victim​.

While these numbers highlight the alarming prevalence of scams, they also underline a sobering reality: each statistic represents a person whose financial security and trust were violated.

On Tuesday (Dec 17) afternoon, another person was nearly added to the statistics – a worker at my home targeted in a police impersonation scam.

My sister and I managed to step in and help her through the immediate crisis, but what followed was a frustrating tangle with the bank’s response processes, making it more challenging to resolve cases such as this.

A close call

On Tuesday, I had scheduled a part-time cleaning session. Around 2.45 pm, I overheard a stern, accented male voice, accompanied by the worker’s distressed replies.

Curious, my sister and I stepped out to find her on a WhatsApp video call with a man dressed in a blue jacket, cap, and mask. Behind him was what appeared to be an official crest, resembling that of the Singapore Police Force.

On the grainy video, it looked convincingly official.

The worker was on the DBS mobile app, with the caller’s image visible in a small corner of the screen. Upon seeing us, the caller angrily demanded that no one else be on the call. We immediately ended it.

The caller, impersonating a police officer, had already convinced the worker to share her banking app’s User ID and PIN. Only her one-time password stood between him and her savings. Thankfully, we intervened just in time.

Verification woes

Two issues quickly emerged: the worker, a Burmese national, had limited English proficiency, and the scammer was relentlessly calling her.

She tried logging into her DBS app but was unable to. We assumed her PIN had been compromised.

We called the DBS hotline to secure her account. The menu was clear and easy to navigate; we quickly connected with a staff member who began the identity verification process.

The first few questions – debit card number and full name – were straightforward. Then came the third: how many debit and credit cards did she hold with DBS?

The worker did not understand the question. When I asked the staff to rephrase it, I was told I could not assist.

In theory, this policy prevents coercion. In practice, it failed. The staff suggested transferring the call to a Mandarin-speaking colleague, but the worker spoke only Burmese. Alternative questions? Not an option.

When I asked if the account could be blocked or if money had been withdrawn, the staff gave vague responses such as: “If she has an account, it would be blocked.”

This non-committal answer was infuriating, especially with the scam still in progress.

Despite repeatedly emphasising the urgency, the rigid process and lack of clarity only added to the stress. The scammer’s calls kept coming, and it felt as if the system was not equipped to handle such situations effectively.

Our experience thus far raised two key questions. First, could the bank enhance its verification processes by offering multilingual support – such as leveraging generative artificial intelligence tools – to better serve Singapore’s diverse population?

Second, should frontline staff members be given the flexibility to adapt or deviate from the standard protocol when customers face language barriers, to prevent delays and safeguard victims of ongoing scams?

No fast lane

Due to the failed phone verification process, the worker was advised to visit a DBS branch for assistance.

I was surprised to find that an expedited queue for scam victims was not part of the standard operating procedure, despite our clear communication about the urgency of the situation.

Instead, a forceful complaint was required to prompt action. Why is it not standard practice to prioritise customers who explicitly report an active scam?

Perhaps the staff assumed there was no immediate risk since we had already called the hotline. However, the failed phone verification – and non-committal answers – had left us without any assurance that the account had been securely blocked.

Dennis Khoo, managing director of consultancy allDigitalFuture and a former senior banker, told The Business Times that regulations mandate an expedited service level for scam reporting, with the preferred channel being the hotline, as visiting branches is typically slower.

“So, it is possible that there is a delay at the branch as it is hard for all branches to cater to this, given (that) the standard procedure is a scam hotline,” Dr Khoo explained.

Regarding phone verifications, he explained that banks typically use a standard set of questions, with multiple options available if a customer cannot recall specific information. For example, if a customer is unable to answer a question about the type of foreign currencies they hold, the bank might instead ask about their joint-account holder.

“For verification, they have to stick to the standard questions, as otherwise a scammer could use this process to breach or block an account,” he added.

Language as a barrier

To be clear, significant efforts have been made by banks and authorities to assist scam victims, including implementing anti-scam measures such as voluntary fund locking and expedited reporting through phone banking.

However, one area that warrants improvement is the assumption that all customers are proficient in one of Singapore’s four national languages.

Those who are less educated or less familiar with local languages are often the most vulnerable to scams. A fear of authority and officialdom further increases their susceptibility to manipulation, making them easy targets.

Frontline customer service staff should be empowered to make informed decisions, rather than strictly adhere to rigid rule books and protocols.

In such cases, providing clear reassurance that one’s banking credentials are safeguarded from malicious actors is the most essential service a bank can offer.

Yet on Tuesday afternoon, all we encountered was uncertainty and frustration.