Progress in corporate governance, but challenges lie ahead
Addressing director tenure and board independence can also solve the problem of poor stakeholder engagement.
AS THE Singapore Governance and Transparency Index (SGTI) enters its 10th year of assessment, it is heartening to note the remarkable progress made by companies over the years. For this year, the average overall score for the general category of companies hits an all-time high of 56.3 from 33.9 in 2009. In the category of real estate investment trusts (Reits) and business trusts, there is a marked rise to 74.5 from 60.4 last year when this category was started.
The SGTI is based on a core assessment framework of five sections: (1) board responsibilities; (2) rights of shareholders; (3) engagement of stakeholders; (4) accountability and audit; and (5) disclosure and transparency. We examined the governance performance along these specific sections and found that companies generally performed well in the various sections, except the one on stakeholder engagement (see Figure 1). Notably, for companies in the general category, this section scored only 38 per cent even if it improved from 30 per cent last year.
Within the stakeholder engagement section, there were three more glaring omissions. These were: (1) disclosing policies and activities relating to customer health and safety; (2) publishing data on employee training and development; and (3) describing the company's anti-corruption programmes and procedures. In each of these separate aspects, only one-fifth of all companies in the general category fulfil the assessment criteria.
Beyond good overall progress of companies and the specific need for improvement in stakeholder engagement, let us look ahead at the critical concerns in the new corporate governance landscape when the Code of Corporate Governance and Singapore's Exchange Listing Rules are revised. A most fundamental aspect that receives much attention is director tenure and board independence.
For this year's SGTI, we have an interesting range from new directors who just joined to the very seasoned directors who served more than 50 years (the director with the longest tenure now is on the board for some 55 years). Figure 2 shows the distribution of director tenure.
We made a fascinating observation that director tenure seems to have an impact on independent directors as shown in Figure 3. When director tenure increases, it seems that the proportion of independent directors decreases.
We further examined whether companies making comprehensive assessment of the definition of director independence has any impact on director tenure. In a very revealing way, if companies do not make such independence definition, directors tend to stay longer. On average, when independence definition is made, director tenure is 7.7 years compared to an increased 8.8 years when no such definition is made.
In fact, whether the chairman is independent or non-independent also affects the proportion of independent directors. Companies with independent chairmen have, on average, 54.6 per cent independent directors on the board whereas those with non-independent chairmen have 51.6 per cent.
The observations are very pertinent to gauge our companies' readiness for a scenario when independent directors should form at least one-third of the board as well as the majority of the board if the chair is not independent.
From the current proportion of independent directors in various situations, it appears that the companies are quite ready for the upcoming regulatory requirement. Nevertheless, it is critical to monitor director tenure and chairman independence on a continual basis so as to upkeep the independence of boards.
Board independence has merits that are immense and multi-faceted. It is the highest assurance that the company can be well-managed from the shareholders' and more broadly, the stakeholders' viewpoints.
Interestingly, we tried to ascertain the relationship between the scores in the stakeholder engagement section with director independence. What we found was very illuminating - when the proportion of independent directors goes up, the stakeholder engagement scores increase (see Figure 4).
Even in the three specific areas of improvement needed in stakeholder engagement - customer health and safety, employee training and development, anti-corruption - those companies with higher proportion of independent directors tend to fare better in each of the areas.
So we have a somewhat compelling integrated narrative going forward. In essence, our corporate governance has progressed well over time but we are weak in a particular aspect - stakeholder engagement. In preparing for the new regulatory landscape, we have to address the challenges of director tenure and board independence. In doing so, we can also solve the problem of stakeholder engagement.
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