5 takeaways for Asia from Trump’s new national security strategy
The White House called it an America-first policy that is principled without being “idealistic”
[AUSTIN] Asia plays second fiddle to the Americas, which are framed as priority theatre for the US in President Donald Trump’s newly released National Security Strategy (NSS).
The strategy, which departed from some traditional American foreign policy staples, was contained in a 29-page document released with little fanfare on Dec 4.
The White House called it an America-first policy that is principled without being “idealistic”, muscular without being “hawkish”, and restrained without being “dovish”.
It elevates the Western Hemisphere as America’s highest priority, with an emphasis on arresting migration, combating “narco-terrorists” and assuring US dominance.
Its own neighbourhood is also a region where the US appears keenest to take on China’s spiralling investments and influence. “The United States must be pre-eminent in the Western Hemisphere as a condition of our security and prosperity,” the document says.
“The terms of our alliances, and the terms upon which we provide any kind of aid, must be contingent on winding down adversarial outside influence – from control of military installations, ports, and key infrastructure to the purchase of strategic assets broadly defined,” it says, without naming China explicitly.
1. It’s about interests, not values
Perhaps the most stunning element in the policy, which is sure to echo across Asian capitals, is the shrinkage of US foreign policy ambitions.
Trump has dropped the post-Cold War goal of “permanent American domination of the entire world” because this is a “fundamentally undesirable and impossible goal”.
Also discarded is the push for democracy, which has been a core aspect of US diplomacy for at least 50 years.
Instead, the paper takes the opposite view. Shared values are not needed as a precondition for partnership in Asia and most of the world, the policy says.
However, the strategy does stress cultural bonds with Europe but faults it for practising censorship, suppressing political opposition and straying from common values.
The continent, it holds, has neglected “Western” values and suffered a “loss of national identities and self-confidence” due to immigration and low birth rates. This has caused economic stagnation, military weakness and the “civilisational erasure” of Europe, it says.
“Our goal should be to help Europe correct its current trajectory,” it adds, pledging support for “patriotic” – a likely reference to nationalist, rightist and nativist – movements.
It is also notable that Trump’s policy does not describe Russia as an adversary, nor is Moscow explicitly criticised for its invasion of Ukraine. Instead, the strategy notes that Europe sees Russia as an existential threat, while not articulating what it means for the US itself.
Asian nations closely track US policies on Russia and Ukraine, seeing them as a proxy for Washington’s commitment to allies amid concerns over its reduced bandwidth. China, which has a “no-limits” partnership with Russia, also scrutinises Washington’s stance for the same reason.
The document calls negotiating an end to the Ukraine war a core interest for the US. But the focus is on “cession of hostilities” in Ukraine, not full victory or restoration of territory occupied by Russia.
2. Not so hawkish on China
Trump’s first national security strategy, released in 2017, labelled China as a “strategic revisionist power” seeking to displace the US in the Indo-Pacific through military expansion, unfair trade practices and the export of its authoritarian model.
A similar, overtly hawkish tone is missing in the new strategy, which casts China as more of a potential economic partner than an adversary and mentions a wish to pursue “a genuinely mutually advantageous economic relationship with Beijing”.
“The north star of great power competition with China and Russia – around which the first Trump administration built bipartisan consensus – is gone,” noted Rebecca Lissner, a leading scholar of American grand strategy, in a commentary for the Council on Foreign Relations where she is a senior fellow.
“Rather than describing the scope and scale of China’s systemic challenge to the US and our allies and partners, the 2025 NSS makes clear that economics are ‘the ultimate stakes’,” said Lissner, who was part of the Biden administration’s security team.
“The new paramount objective of Washington’s China policy is a ‘mutually advantageous economic relationship with Beijing’,” she said.
Matthew Kroenig, who leads the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Centre for Strategy and Security, said competition with China is implied throughout the document, although it is never foregrounded.
He pointed out several references sprinkled in the document to a favourable conventional military balance in the Indo-Pacific, to winning the economic and technological competition and to nuclear deterrence and missile defence.
Some analysts think that anti-China language was watered down to avoid upsetting ongoing trade negotiations with Beijing. “That is as plausible an explanation as any,” Kroenig said.
China will love two parts of this strategy and hate the rest, said Emily Harding, vice-president of the defence and security department at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies.
“Beijing will love the explicit declaration that the US preference is non-interference in other nations’ affairs and the clear statement about respecting states’ sovereignty. That may assuage Chinese fears that the US seeks to undermine regime stability,” said Harding. “But China will hate the calls for them to get out of Latin America.”
3. Deterring conflict in Taiwan
The strategy says the US wants to prevent war in the Indo-Pacific, a nod to growing tensions between China and US ally Japan over Taiwan – the self-ruled island that China claims as its own.
Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s Nov 7 observation that a Chinese attack on Taiwan could be an existential threat that triggers a military response from Tokyo ignited anger in China.
The new Trump strategy spells out the need to deter conflict over Taiwan by rejecting any unilateral change to the status quo in the Taiwan Strait and preserving a “military overmatch”.
While the US has no formal diplomatic ties with Taiwan, it is bound by law to provide the island with the means to defend itself.
The document lays down the economic and strategic reasons for attention to Taiwan.
“There is, rightly, much focus on Taiwan, partly because of Taiwan’s dominance of semiconductor production, but mostly because Taiwan provides direct access to the Second Island Chain and splits North-east and South-east Asia into two distinct theatres,” the strategy says.
The second island chain, a strategic maritime barrier in the western Pacific, protects the first island chain (Japan, Taiwan and the Philippines). It enables US power projection and deters Chinese naval expansion.
“Given that one-third of global shipping passes annually through the South China Sea, this has major implications for the US economy. Hence, deterring a conflict over Taiwan, ideally by preserving military overmatch, is a priority.
“We will also maintain our longstanding declaratory policy on Taiwan, meaning that the US does not support any unilateral change to the status quo in the Taiwan Strait,” it says.
The strategy’s position on Taiwan could be described as “mixed”, said Zack Cooper, a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, where he studies US strategy in Asia.
“Supposedly no change in US declaratory policy, but notable they don’t state that the US ‘does not support Taiwan independence’. Leaving the door open for a future adjustment?” he tweeted on X.
The standard US wording is that it opposes changes to the status quo and does not support Taiwan independence. China is reportedly keen to have Trump declare that the US “opposes” Taiwan independence.
4. Quad finds a mention
The Trump administration frames the Indo-Pacific as a vital arena, which already is, and will be, the next century’s key economic and geopolitical battlegrounds.
“To thrive at home, we must successfully compete there – and we are,” it says.
The strategy commits to keeping the Indo-Pacific free and open, preserving freedom of navigation in all crucial sea lanes, and maintaining secure and reliable supply chains and access to critical materials.
It emphasises the prevention of conflict over maritime disputes in the South China Sea through maintaining US military superiority and demands for allies, including Japan, South Korea and Australia, to boost defence spending.
The Trump team is clearly seeing all of Asia through the lens of China, said Cooper, an expert on US alliances in the region. China was mentioned 21 times in the document, while South-east Asia was named twice.
“South-east Asia? Almost completely absent. US treaty ally Philippines isn’t even mentioned. Pacific Islands also nowhere to be seen,” he noted in a tweet.
There was no mention of North Korea either, which rejects the US’ denuclearisation demands and has rebuffed Trump’s outreach efforts.
The strategy, however, discusses the potential for China to exert control over the South China Sea.
“This could allow a potentially hostile power to impose a toll system over one of the world’s most vital lanes of commerce or – worse – to close and reopen it at will. Either of those two outcomes would be harmful to the US economy and broader US interests,” it says.
“Strong measures must be developed along with the deterrence necessary to keep those lanes open, free of ‘tolls’, and not subject to arbitrary closure by one country. This will require not just further investment in our military – especially naval – capabilities, but also strong cooperation with every nation that stands to suffer, from India to Japan and beyond, if this problem is not addressed.”
A somewhat surprising element was a blithe reference to India’s role and to the Quad grouping, given the Trump administration’s turbulent ties with the Modi government and the cancellation of the Quad leaders’ summit in 2025.
“We must continue to improve commercial (and other) relations with India to encourage New Delhi to contribute to Indo-Pacific security, including through continued quadrilateral cooperation with Australia, Japan and the United States,” the strategy says.
5. It’s all about the economy
While claiming the US is no longer eyeing world domination, the strategy makes no bones about Washington’s wish for industrial, technological and energy dominance.
It stresses preserving secure supply chains and access to raw materials, as well as protecting US export markets. It also states the need for a strong defence-industrial and manufacturing base to sustain military balance and stay ahead in artificial intelligence, and quantum and super computing.
“All our embassies must be aware of major business opportunities in their country, especially major government contracts,” the strategy says.
“Every US government official that interacts with these countries should understand that part of their job is to help American companies compete and succeed.”
How seriously can it be taken?
No written document can truly guide, capture or discipline Trump’s often impulsive, erratic and opportunistic foreign policy, noted Lissner.
“Further, the unceremonious roll-out – a late-night release seemingly without an accompanying speech by the President or national security adviser – suggests the White House could see the NSS mostly as a box-checking exercise, rather than a binding statement of strategic intent,” she said.
“Its many audiences, from Capitol Hill to allied capitals, should discount it accordingly.” THE STRAITS TIMES
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