1,000 days in, Ukraine conflict may be at beginning of end

THIS week marks the grim milestone of 1,000 days of war since Russia’s invasion. However, the date is more than a calendar milestone, and now is the time not just for Ukraine, but also Europe, to urgently prepare for a potentially decisive 2025 ahead.

For while the conflict sometimes seems never-ending, the ground now appears to be shifting towards the beginnings of a potentially difficult, protracted negotiated settlement. To paraphrase legendary UK prime minister Winston Churchill, the latest developments may not only mark the end of the beginning of the war. They may also hasten the beginning of the end of the conflict, even if any negotiations take beyond 2025.

The big shift, in recent weeks, has not come on the battlefield in Ukraine per se. Instead, it has arrived with the election of Donald Trump on Nov 5 for a second presidential term.

Trump’s pledge to end the war in a day is probably fanciful. However, it would be a remarkable turnaround if he were not to seek to pressurise one or both sides to try to end the war during his presidency, which begins in January.

This appears to have been understood by both Russian President Vladimir Putin and Ukrainian counterpart Volodymyr Zelensky. Putin appears to be escalating Moscow’s offensive with a new round of devastating air strikes in Ukraine.

Moreover, President Joe Biden’s recent decision to allow Ukraine to use Western-made, long-range missiles inside Russia’s territory for the first time has been welcomed by Zelensky. This decision is specifically in relation to the Kursk region, where Ukraine has made its first offensive into Russian territory.

One of the key drivers of Biden’s decision appears to have been the integration of thousands of North Koreans into Russia’s fighting forces in Ukraine. This has helped reverse the US president’s previous caution on this issue.

While there has been much media coverage this week of the pros and cons of Biden’s choice, it is most unlikely to be a game changer. The decision – which could be reversed by Trump as soon as January – has probably come too late in Biden’s term of office to make a huge impact, not least as the decision is specifically confined to the Kursk region.

Rather than either side therefore now seeking to “win” the war, it is much more realistic that the goal of both sides now is trying to maximise battlefield gains. This is ahead of any move towards a Moscow-Kyiv negotiation in 2025, so as to influence any peace.

While Putin has not acknowledged this yet in public, Zelensky has. He recently said that “it is certain that the war will end sooner with the policies of the (Trump) team that will now lead the White House. This is their approach, their promise to their citizens”.

So latest developments potentially mark a new phase in the almost three-year conflict that began in February 2022. This after months of Russia making battlefield gains in Ukraine that have mostly extinguished Western expectations that Ukraine might achieve all of its strategic war objectives.

Peter Ricketts, a former UK national security adviser, believes there is a growing possibility of a Korea-style scenario with Russia keeping control of around a fifth of pre-war Ukraine, and the remainder moving in a pro-Western direction in the years to come.

One key question, in this context, comes from Europe’s stance from January onward. Ukraine’s future security is a key interest for the European Union and non-EU nations alike, and there was much talk at the G20 this week about next steps.

While Europe’s strategy is not yet finalised, what is sure is that the region will need a clear, coordinated approach if it is to have significant influence in coming weeks. It will therefore concern many on the continent that there is a split over Biden’s decision to allow Ukraine to use long-range missiles in the Kursk. This has been welcomed by German Chancellor Olaf Scholz and UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer, but not by Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, who currently holds the G7 chair.

Europe’s leaders, even Meloni, know that any outcome in Ukraine that is perceived as a potentially big Russian victory may only embolden Putin and his allies across the world. Europe, the United States plus the wider West therefore have strategic interests in ensuring the best possible outcome for Kyiv.

With huge uncertainties over what the Trump presidency will bring policy-wise, there is growing recognition that Europe may well need to step up to the plate, much further. Sooner rather than later, for instance, there may still be a critical funding gap that only Europe and allies including Canada, Japan and Australia, can try to at least – partially – fill.

Beyond extra funding, there is also a need for clearer grand strategy too. This includes the potential political integration of Ukraine into the West.

This includes Brussels moving forward with accession talks for Ukraine to potentially join the EU. Beyond that, the West can also put Kyiv onto a pathway to possible Nato membership too.

Moreover, important commitments can be made on reconstruction. The rebuilding of Ukraine may approximate that of Western Europe after 1945, Eastern Europe after the Cold War, and the Western Balkans after the breakup of Yugoslavia. It will cost many hundreds of billions of euros, and be the most ambitious post-war reconstruction effort in the 21st century.

Amid all this uncertainty, Europe should also not forget that, while Moscow’s forces have gained ground in Ukraine in 2024, the impact of the war remains overall negative for Russia. Not only have there been massive military casualties for Moscow, estimated to be over 1,000 dead a day, during intensive fighting. In addition, the strains on Russia’s economy are also showing.

Even if Putin can stay in power himself, his political position may be weakened if a peace deal is eventually agreed that does not strongly favour Russia after the loss of so much blood and treasure. Indeed, there may even be an outside possibility that his regime shows itself to be significantly more fragile than it sometimes seems.

Taken together, the war is therefore now entering a new phase ahead of the second Trump presidency. Given huge uncertainty ahead for Ukraine, now is the moment for Europe to double down on its commitment to Zelensky given the huge incentives they have to bolster his negotiating position ahead of 2025.

The writer is an associate at LSE IDEAS at the London School of Economics