The BRI transformation makes it a more – not less – useful tool for China

WHEN Chinese President Xi Jinping announced the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in Kazakhstan in 2013, it attracted much speculation across the globe. Shrouded in nebulous historical analogies and proverbs, many thought of the BRI as a mere diplomatic trick. However, Chinese overseas lending – already on the rise since the mid-2000s – grew exponentially under the mantra of this grand initiative.

The official objective for the BRI, as stated in the 2015 State Council’s Vision and actions on jointly building Belt and Road plan, was to improve connectivity in three areas. First, trade and investment, with transport infrastructure as a key enabler. Second, people-to-people connectivity, which was supported by the development of the relevant infrastructure (that is, institutional partnerships to facilitate cultural exchanges). Finally, financial cooperation that would enable the financing of huge infrastructure needs stemming from the BRI.

Since 2015, many developments in China have changed how people, especially Western scholars, view the BRI. Because of the US-China trade war, the US containment of China’s technological rise, and China’s much more belligerent approach to the West, many now see the BRI as a way for China to expand its influence in the rest of the world. China’s key objectives have changed since Xi rose to power. China has made the US its main rival, shifting away from the collaborative relationship under previous Chinese leaders such as Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao.