China’s 1% is watching the other 99%

OVER the past decade, the introduction of advanced surveillance technologies in China has given the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) more power to spy on citizens than any regime in history. Western governments fear this techno-authoritarian model could spread as China sells its gear to developing countries around the world. The United States has imposed a slew of restrictions on Chinese companies in part to slow the development and export of such technologies.

While vigilance is warranted, apocalyptic warnings about a world dominated by Chinese-style Big Brothers are overblown. China’s surveillance state is so powerful not because of technology, but because of the CCP’s unrivalled organisational presence and sophistication. That unique system can’t be exported as easily as cameras, sensors and software.

Even the fanciest mass surveillance technologies suffer from blind spots and limited coverage. Potential subjects can resort to simple evasive measures such as wearing masks, using burner phones, or turning up the TV volume to thwart listening devices.

Moreover, China did not complete the installation of the techno-surveillance apparatus described in breathless media accounts until about 2010. The use of facial recognition was popularised only in the mid-2010s. China’s spying capabilities were well advanced long before then.

Besides technology, a truly capable surveillance state must possess a vast intelligence network, well-organised mass surveillance programmes, close coordination among different security bureaucracies and state-affiliated actors, and well-honed operational tactics. China has developed unrivalled capabilities in all these areas thanks to the CCP’s deep and extensive reach in China’s society and economy.

Before China had the resources to invest in advanced hardware, the party relied mostly on its organisational capacity and proven operational tactics to spy on known and potential threats.

Its singular accomplishment has been the recruitment of millions of informants who perform distinct tasks. As the party maintains cells in local communities, universities, and state-owned enterprises, it has enormous leverage to pressure individuals to act as informants. It can dangle career opportunities and material rewards, or wield implicit threats, to turn ordinary citizens into “ears and eyes” (which is an actual category of police informants) of the state.

Some informants spy on known targets, such as dissidents, noisy petitioners, supposed cult members and members of ethnic minorities. Others watch critical venues such as hotels, shopping malls and train stations. Most provide general intelligence on public reaction to government policy and major domestic and international incidents.

Based on my research, I would put the number of informants recruited by Chinese police and local authorities at around 14 million people, or 1 per cent of the population, which is close to the ratio in East Germany before the fall of the Berlin Wall.

As most of today’s autocracies lack the same degree of social control as the CCP or communist regimes in the former Soviet bloc, building and maintaining such a large network of informants is beyond their reach. And a surveillance state without so many “ears and eyes” is unlikely to be anywhere near as effective.

Another of the CCP’s key weapons is a specialised bureaucracy, the Central Political-Legal Committee (and its local outfits).

Even China’s extensive internal security forces are limited in manpower and resources. Many other state actors must be involved to make the system work, which requires smooth and regular inter-agency coordination.

The party bureaucracy responsible for security is a Chinese invention, unlike anything in the former Soviet Union or East Germany. Each year, this committee convenes an annual conference to set the agenda for domestic security, issuing directives to state-affiliated entities. It oversees the secret police, as well as new initiatives such as the recent expansion and upgrade of a high-tech surveillance system known as Sharp Eyes.

While advanced technologies certainly help, regimes that command strong organisational capabilities are likely to apply such technologies more effectively and to find synergies between gadgets and spies. For example, China relies on technology to track the movements of suspects, mostly by monitoring their mobile phones. But authorities also deploy informants near targets to report on their activities and mental state, thus minimising gaps in surveillance.

No doubt, China’s high-definition cameras, facial-recognition algorithms, and cloud computing resources will offer autocrats around the world extensive new spying capabilities. Without the political software to go along with the hardware, though, these wannabe surveillance states won’t be as all-seeing as they may hope.

The writer is professor of government at Claremont McKenna College and author of The Sentinel State: Surveillance and the Survival of Dictatorship in China