Abe faces delicate balancing act in modifying Japan's defence strategy
JAPAN'S hostage crisis, culminating in the beheading of journalist Kenji Goto by Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) militants, was an act of barbarity that deserves the strong condemnation that it got from Japan and the international community. On the foreign policy front, it provides an opportunity for Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's administration to re-examine its security strategy.
What is important is that Japan must not set off down a road that could lead to further confrontation. "Let the nightmare for Japan begin," a masked ISIS figure said in an online video before beheading Mr Goto in the savage act that shocked Japan and the world. However melodramatic the assassin's words sounded, they have a chilling ring for Japan.
The crisis can be understood only in the context of history. Various Japanese political leaders before Mr Abe have complained that, within the constraints set by its US-imposed post-war "pacifist" Constitution, Japan cannot be a "normal" nation able to defend its interests and citizens. But they have nevertheless chosen to abide by that Constitution and the pacifist image of (post-war) Japan thus created has generally insulated the country and its people from outside attack, including from terrorists. All that may have changed almost overnight, as the hostage crisis has revealed.
Mr Abe wants to project Japan's international presence through an enhanced military capability. By reinterpreting or amending the nation's Constitution, he aims to expand the range of missions that Japan's Self-Defense Forces could join if Japan's "vital national interests" are threatened. Most such missions are likely to be US-led; thus, Mr Abe appears to be binding Japan's fortunes even closer to those of its powerful ally. Even before this, he chose to give a speech on a recent tour of the Middle East promising (non-military) aid to countries confronting ISIS.
That speech delivered at a time when ISIS was already holding Japanese hostages is credited by some with having touched off the crisis. The wisdom of Mr Abe's choice of Jordan - a firm ally of the US but not of ISIS - to establish a crisis coordination centre has also been questioned. Whether such criticisms are valid or not (and they seem doubtful), there is no question that in the circumstances, the Abe administration tried its best to achieve a negotiated solution.
Mr Abe declared on Monday, immediately after Mr Goto's murder, his determination to discuss changes that would allow Japan's military to at least rescue Japanese citizens in danger. This is an understandable reaction, and Mr Abe has some public opinion on his side. However, it would mean a significant shift away from Japan's traditionally pacifist approach to international affairs: an approach that still commands the support of a large segment (perhaps the majority) of Japanese society. Mr Abe will need to convince them (and some of Japan's neighbours, too) that Japan's military will act only under very specific and clearly defined circumstances - and that, for the most part, Japan's traditional, non-confrontational approach to international relations will continue.
