Beyond hedging: Asean could help bridge differences between China and US

FOREIGN policy thinkers have compared the governments of today’s South-east Asian nations to the rulers of the Italian city-states in the age of Niccolo Machiavelli – small but pragmatic international players that have embraced a realpolitik strategy aimed at protecting their interests in a system dominated by the struggle between great global powers.

More specifically, the conventional wisdom is that the governments represented in the Association of South-east Asian Nations (Asean) have pursued national security policies that political scientists and economists describe as “hedging”. Hedging involves a mix of cooperative and confrontational elements that amounts to an insurance-seeking behaviour when operating in a high-risk situation: A small state avoids taking sides and pursues opposite measures vis-a-vis competing great powers, allowing them to minimise risks and maximise benefits, and providing them with a fall-back position that secures their survival.

In the current strategic environment in the Asia-Pacific dominated by rising tensions between a rising regional power – China, that is seeking to expand its economic and military power, and an outside power – the United States – that is resisting these Chinese policies, countries like Singapore, Malaysia, the Philippines or Vietnam feel that these 2 global behemoths are trying to pull them in opposite directions and pressing them to take sides.

In response, South-east Asian governments are responding by, indeed, hedging their strategic bets and searching for “middle” positions between China, their biggest regional trading partner which also threatens them by throwing its weight around militarily, and the US, a traditional strategic partner that serves as a counterweight to their surging regional neighbour. That policy seemed to work well at the time when Washington and Beijing were engaged in a peaceful competition.

But such an approach could become more difficult to maintain in light of the growing geostrategic and geoeconomic confrontation, or Cold War II, that ignites costly trade wars and which could, under the worst-case scenario, lead to a military confrontation. Or even a nuclear war between China and the US over Taiwan or other issues.

Under these conditions, South-east Asian nations may have no other choice but to take sides and opt for “bandwagoning” either China or the US as they try to predict which of the 2 would emerge as the winning power. But if we consider the prospect of a war between China and the US, the dilemma facing the South-east Asian nations would go beyond “balancing” or “bandwagoning”. Such a war, especially if it leads to a nuclear confrontation, would result not only in an economic disaster but also a human catastrophe, leading to the deaths of hundreds of thousands of people and making the entire region unliveable.

Averting a war between China and the US should therefore be regarded as a core interest of the nations in South-east Asia, and in that context, they are in a position to help reduce the tensions between these 2 powers.

In particular, leaders in the region who have cultural ties with both the Chinese and the Americans could try to correct misperceptions that the elites in Beijing and Washington have about each other, and reduce the chances for misunderstanding when it comes to making critical policy decisions. In other words, they can play a “bridging” role, and not just be hedging.