Eurozone's big fear is a successful Grexit
ONE of the things that is probably scaring eurozone authorities more than most people suppose is the threat that Greece may not only survive but actually thrive outside of the "common currency" area. The temptation for other peripheral economies to follow suit may then become irresistible.
As with many other things in life, the fear of something happening can often be worse than the event itself. It is only after the "worst" has happened that we realise that there are compensations to all states and that (to quote Franklin Roosevelt) "all we have to fear is fear itself".
If there were to be a Greek exit (Grexit) from the euro, it is reasonable to assume that a restored drachma would be pegged at a level well below one to one with the euro. Probably this will represent a sharp devaluation not only against the euro but against other currencies too.
The price of Greece's exports (mainly refined petroleum and other products to Turkey, Italy and Germany) will fall while the cost of imports (crude petroleum and other commodities from Russia, Germany, Italy and the Middle East) will rise. The net impact will depend upon how much value is added in Greece.
But it is not so much on the trade as on the capital account that Greece may gain from Grexit and from a devalued drachma. Germany, France, the UK, Luxembourg and the Netherlands, plus Cyprus, the US and Switzerland are important investors and may become more so with a cheaper drachma.
Tourism, as well as other services, in which Greece has become more attractive to foreign investors in recent years (partly because of the lower costs imposed by austerity programmes) will possibly, or even probably, receive a significant boost too under a Grexit.
Of course, Greece's foreign debt will surge in value under the combined impact of a Grexit-cum-devaluation. But as Greece will have every incentive to default or at least demand debt deferment and "haircuts" once it leaves the euro area, that is something Athens can probably live with.
FREEDOM TO DEVALUE
The main point, however, is that Greek authorities will have the flexibility either to formally devalue their currency, or to let the market force it down to a point where Greece is seen to be competitive again - a freedom they have lacked since joining the euro area.
Fiscal flexibility will also be restored because of the ability to let the currency take the strain, thereby depriving Germany and other European powers of the ability to force Greece to accept punishing fiscal austerity in order to stay in line with the Maastricht Treaty.
There can of course be a downside to all this. Drastic devaluation can force up prices dramatically in Greece while the temptation to use the currency weapon as a buffer against shock can remove just about all domestic fiscal discipline, including the danger of soaring wage demands.
Even so, it is a double standard to expect Greece to continue accepting fiscal austerity and the monetary discipline implied by a fixed exchange rate when the US is just emerging from massive monetary easing and when Japan and even the EU are still embarking upon such programmes.
The euro was always more of a political than an economic construct and is widely regarded as the "cement" that has bound together the European Union. But that does not mean that it will remain effective indefinitely if internal economic strains become too great, as in Greece's case.
If there is a Grexit, and if Greece does not disappear into the Aegean Sea after that, then highly indebted Italy, or Portugal and maybe others may be tempted to toy with the idea of similar exits. Britain - a member of the EU but not of the eurozone - will then be on a par with others.
Common currency-denominated financial transactions will presumably still be possible within a looser currency area, in the same way that European business corporations were able to issue bonds in a common denomination prior to the formal advent of the euro.
POLITICAL IMPACT
None of this addresses the possible political impact upon Europe of a Grexit. Russia may be tempted to take advantage of a Europe that is seen to be fragmenting politically and economically, and China may be tempted to dabble in those waters too while the US will be marginalised.
My former colleague (and economics editor) on The Times of London has for some time challenged the view that "Grexit" from the eurozone is an "avoidable catastrophe". Instead, he argues that "the eurozone is an avoidable catastrophe for Greece and for Europe". It is the euro, he argues, that "has been the problem, preventing the exchange rate adjustments that alone can absorb shocks and adjust competitiveness among multiple sovereign economies". We are about to find out the truth or otherwise of this argument, it seems.
Read more on the Greek crisis here