It may not be a trade war, but it could still be costly and dangerous

THERE is nothing new about US administrations being drawn into trade disputes with America's economic partners or, for that matter, about them pushing for protectionist measures against allies such as Germany or Japan.

For much of the 1980s, the United States and Japan were engaged in numerous trade quarrels, with Japan - like China today - accused of "stealing" American jobs and pursuing unfair trade practices. In response, US presidents - committed as they were to free trade principles - ended up imposing major tariffs on Japanese imports, creating a sense of crisis between the two allies. At the same time, US officials threatened to impose stiff tariffs on European products as part of a strategy to press its transatlantic allies to make concessions during trade negotiations.

In the case of Japan, trade squabbles with the Europeans ignited fears of global trade wars and collapse of the post-World War II Western alliances. Recalling these episodes is not an attempt to play down the current trade tensions between the US and China, as well as with staunch allies such as Canada, Germany and Japan, or to suggest that the US decisions to enact aluminium and steel tariffs against its partners in Europe and North America, and to threaten to impose tariffs on US$50 billion in Chinese imports, could not evolve into explosive trade wars.

While US and Chinese trade officials made little headway in their recent talks in Beijing, and the Trump administration showed no signs of backing down from the restrictive metal tariffs, efforts to resolve these trade disputes are continuing. Yet even if all sides refrain from inching into wider trade wars, the danger is that if US President Donald Trump continues to advance his economic nationalist agenda, his policies will pose a challenge to the current international trade system based on mutually accepted rules and principles. After all, notwithstanding their occasional protectionist measures, Mr Trump's predecessors had fully embraced this liberal international trade system, while he, on the other hand, has taken steps to weaken it.

Mr Trump pulled the United States out of the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP) trade agreement and pledged to revoke the North American Free Trade Agreement (Nafta) unless it would be renegotiated. In the name of protecting national security, he imposed restrictions on metal imports and threatened to impose tariffs on car imports from countries that are long-time military allies of the United States. These moves also run contrary to World Trade Organization (WTO) rules, which Mr Trump is accusing China of violating as he pressures it to protect accepted International Property Rights (IPR) and threatens to impose tariffs on its imports.

And with his economic nationalist and pro-free trade advisers continuing to bicker, it remains to be seen what Mr Trump is actually demanding from the Chinese on trade. While Washington has the right and obligation to protect its interests by insisting that China, the European Union, Canada and Japan make concessions on trade, its recent unilateral steps are bound to lead to a loss of trust in its policies and in its commitment to the WTO and other multilateral trade arrangements.

Mr Trump, however, will have an opportunity to prove his critics wrong when he meets the leaders of the Group of Seven in Quebec, Canada, this week, by ending the fights with America's partners on metal imports and by outlining a coherent China trade strategy that those allies might actually support.