I've come full circle on the wisdom of a common currency
I HAVE changed my mind about the euro and no longer believe it is a concept to which all European nations should subscribe.
So what, you may ask. My only claim to a hearing is that I have followed the history of the euro from its inception to the present, and from both a European and an Asian perspective.
I began from what can be termed a position of inherited scepticism about the common currency in the early 1970s, when it was still a gleam in the eye of the European Union's founding fathers. I say "inherited" because the scepticism was instilled in me by then economics editor Peter Jay of The Times in London, for which I then worked.
An outstanding graduate of Christchurch College, Oxford, and described by Time magazine as the "brightest young man in England and a future world leader", he saw with penetrating foresight the kind of problems that Greece is grappling with now and which may yet lead to the country's exit from the euro.
As I recall now, after nearly 40 years, he argued that countries, like regions of a country, can from time to time and for various reasons become uncompetitive internationally, and require help while they make a transition to a better situation.
But there is a critical difference between a country with sovereign control over its affairs and a region. A country can devalue its currency to regain competitiveness while it restructures its economy; a region of a country cannot, of course, do the same and so requires significant aid from the centre in the form of grants or soft loans, and not market loans of the kind Greece has incurred.
If you think of Greece as a region of the European Union and one where the ideas of the centre (Brussels in this case) can be very different from those of the regional capital (Athens) with regard to the amount of financial aid required, you begin to see the dilemma.
HOW DEVALUATION HELPS
But there are other reasons why losing the currency-devaluation option can be a real problem for countries such as Greece, where the tourism sector is so important.
A formal devaluation (or allowing the market to depreciate the currency) brings rapid benefits to tourism in the form of increased earnings and taxes, which can be used for restructuring.
A country such as Germany would not rate the devaluation option so highly because sophisticated capital goods of the kind it produces cannot so easily improve their international competitiveness on price grounds alone, because their domestic value-added content is higher.
In a currency union, everyone is bound by a single exchange rate regardless of such differences.
So why did I come to see the European single currency in a less-critical light after leaving the UK for Asia in 1976 ? One reason was that in succeeding decades, Asia - and South-east Asia in particular - was grappling with the concept of regional economic integration, and the EU seemed to be a good model.
Even if currency union á la the eurozone and a common currency appeared to be a good way off for Asia - many said 40 years at least - the euro still seemed from afar to be a shining example of how far economic and financial integration could progress, given the political will.
Another reason why I came to approve of the euro experiment - and an experiment is certainly what it was - was that the European common currency provided an alternative to the dollar as a repository for foreign exchange reserves and as a unit in which global financial transactions could be conducted.
There are arguments for and against the idea of managing such transactions overwhelmingly in one currency (the dollar) in a unipolar rather than multipolar system. But it is certainly true that after its Jan 1, 1999 birth, the euro was to become a viable alternative to the dollar.
Meanwhile, back in the eurozone or euro area, internal stresses created by adopting a binding currency union ahead of full fiscal union (on issues such as public spending) was creating stresses that nearly brought not only Greece, but also Ireland, Portugal and Spain to their knees.
It became obvious that countries with very diverse fiscal records and capabilities were able to issue debt in a Triple A-rated currency (the euro) that ranked them equal with, say Germany, even though euro-denominated bonds were issued at different yields.
Looking back now from Asia (Tokyo in my case) to Europe, I can see that the pain or tyranny of trying to adapt to a common currency, even within 15 years or so, is just too great to bear; the ease and prestige of being able to transact in euro is just not worth the cost.
Quite where this leaves Europe in the foreseeable future is not obvious at this stage. What does seem clear to me is that Greece will be obliged to leave the euro at some point and that others in Europe, seeing how it might thrive thereafter, will feel bound to follow suit.
What lesson should Asia draw from all this?
Obviously, the first is not to rush into a currency union as Europe did. Continue allowing national currencies to take the strain of adjusting competitiveness while improving the efficiency of foreign exchange markets.
If a common currency is seen to be desirable within a particular region, create a mechanism within that region for compensating Greek-style nations that lose most from lack of exchange rate flexibility. Work toward creating not just a common central bank but also a common fiscal policy.
FULL POLITICAL UNION
The shortcut to all this would be full political union among countries that wish to integrate their economies fully, in line with the pressures toward such integration created by globalisation of trade and investment regimes. This isn't easy, but there's no real halfway house.
European Central Bank governor Mario Draghi said as much recently, arguing that you cannot put the cart before the proverbial horse by opting for monetary union ahead of economic union.
I have a sense of deju vu when I think back to Mr Jay's arguments 40 years ago.
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