Japan-Australia agreement augments anti-China alliance
THE announcement last autumn of the Australia-United Kingdom-United States (AUKUS) security pact made many headlines across the world. Yet, the lower-profile Japan-Australia Reciprocal Access Agreement (RAA), embracing both defence and economics, could prove significant too.
RAA, under negotiation since 2014, is the first deal of its kind that Japan has struck since the Status of Forces Agreement with the US more than six decades ago. It eases restrictions on the movement of weapons and supplies for joint training and disaster relief operations, and also provides a springboard for greater economic collaboration. Take the example of Australia's new Clean Hydrogen Trade Programme with an initial US$150 million commitment to export to Japan. Prime Minister Scott Morrison wants his nation to be a clean hydrogen supplier of choice, and has promised to showcase green-energy innovation at the Osaka World Expo in 2025. The Japan-Australia agreement highlights how much Japan is now growing in strategic importance as a partner in an emerging international, anti-China alliance. Not only is Tokyo a long-standing member of Western-led clubs such as the G7, plus the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, there is also growing speculation that it could be invited to join the so-called "5 Eyes" intelligence alliance; and the RAA could become a "template" for other Western nations such as the UK to establish a stronger future regional presence in the Asia-Pacific.
While much emphasis is put on the security pillar of the Japanese-Western alliance, economics is key too. The transformation of Japan's world role in recent decades stemmed, in part, from its phenomenal post-war business success, which has led to growing calls for it to match its economic power with commitment to international political relations too.
Key Western countries, especially those in Europe, have welcomed Japan's invigorated commitment to international trade. Not only did Tokyo sign in recent years a bilateral agreement with the US, it has also committed to an EU trade agreement covering around a third of global GDP and almost 650 million people. Moreover, Japan was at the vanguard of the so-called Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, which accounts for around 13 per cent of global trade and a combined population of around 500 million.
A key part of the rationale for Tokyo's growing strategic importance is that it is perceived in the West as an increasingly important bulwark against the advance of China and, potentially, Russia into the Asia-Pacific. Yet, there remain limits to Japan's international assertiveness. This was highlighted by the prime ministerships of Shinzo Abe from 2006-07 and 2012-2020; the nation's longest serving premier had sought to overturn several key remaining underpinnings of the country's post-1945 pacifist security identity in order for it to become more externally engaged. This included attempted abolition of Article Nine - the clause in Japan's post-war constitution which constrains the country's military to a strictly defensive role rather than a conventional army, and has meant that defence spending has mostly remained below 1 per cent of GDP for much of the post-war period.
However, the two-thirds majority needed in both chambers of the Japanese legislature, plus a simple majority in a national referendum, proved an insuperable obstacle for Abe to overcome. There remains a large body of public opinion which continues to value post-war pacifism, and this will continue to act as a check on Japan's foreign policy in the 2020s, despite the new willingness of successive governments in Tokyo to take on a bigger posture in the region.
