Nato needs to contain Russia's military adventurism

THE Trump administration's erstwhile appeasement of Russia is fraught with danger as it may embolden Moscow to show its military aggression in the Baltic States and Europe. Countries bordering Russia are worried, and US think tanks have been warning that US and European capability to give a military response to Moscow's future adventurism is severely limited.

The fears are all too real. The Lithuanian intelligence service warned on April 3 that Russia could attack the tiny Baltic states of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia - with just 24 hours' notice, leaving the West with scant ability to respond. The Lithuanian government voiced its worries in its annual threat assessment that was released to the media. Norwegian military intelligence also warned in February of increased threat from Russia.

The Soviet Union annexed the Baltic States in the 1940s, but now they are members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (Nato) and the European Union. These states have been extremely worried since Russia's annexation of Crimea three years ago.

Lithuania is alarmed by Moscow upgrading its military in the Russian enclave of Kaliningrad on the Baltic Sea last year, installing ballistic nuclear-capable missiles and missile defence systems.

Rand Corporation senior analyst David Shlapak argued in a report: Deterring Russian aggression in the Baltic States: What it takes to win, released last month, that Nato lacks an adequate conventional deterrent to Russian aggression against its most exposed member states - the Baltic republics.

The report suggested: "A minimum deterrent - one that keeps Nato in the game for longer than two or three days - requires a force of about seven brigades, three of them armoured." It added that "a more robust posture - one that can 'win the game' by successfully defending for an extended period and, if necessary, eventually counter-attacking to eject Russian forces - will require up to 12 additional brigades from the United States and its allies".

"Winning", however, does not mean fighting a war against Russia because a war would be a monumental strategic failure. Rather, winning means deploying the necessary forces to deter any Russian incursion aimed at Nato member states by denying Moscow its objectives without escalating to the use of nuclear weapons.

Mr Shlapak believes that Nato must combine rebuilding its conventional military forces with establishing a productive dialogue with Moscow, in order to reduce the prospect of a crisis and minimise the chances of "blowing up the game".

American core objectives in Europe since 1945 are to oversee peace and stability, sustain and encourage the rise of democratic forces, and prevent Moscow from using armed force to coerce the free people of Europe.

Rand believes that Nato's current forces are "woefully inadequate" to face a Russian attack on the Baltic States. These states could fall to Russian forces within 60 hours.

Mr Shlapak argues that such an outcome would leave the US and Nato with a terrible scenario as Nato would collapse, and the trans-Atlantic security alliance would be shattered. It would mark a failure of US efforts to stabilise the world order since the end of the Second World War.

"So, Nato needs to be able to stay in the game," he proposes. The US and Nato should, therefore, not offer Moscow a vision of an easy strategic victory by deploying a strong deterrent force.

Rand recommends that Nato needs to be able to rapidly mobilise at least 21 army brigades in the Baltic States. These forces would expectedly come from the US, but it remains to be seen whether President Donald Trump will allow the deployment, given his repeated threats to scale back US forces around the world.

US Army General Curtis Scaparrotti, who assumed command of Nato's Allied Command Operations last year, has declared that Nato is facing a "resurgent Russia striving to project itself as a world power".

SERIOUS THREAT

US Lieutenant General Vincent Stewart, Director of the US Defence Intelligence Agency, warned in February last year that Moscow views military power as a means of achieving its strategic objectives of attaining great power status, dominating smaller regional countries and deterring Nato from military action in Eurasia.

The Carnegie Endowment for Peace argued in a report by analyst Richard Sokolsky in March this year: "From Nato's vantage point, Russia poses a serious military threat to its eastern flank."

Evidence for these threats is seen in improvement in Russian military capabilities following increased spending and military modernisation launched in 2008. As well, the Kremlin is pursuing a "far more aggressive, anti-Western foreign policy", which is seen in "provocative military manoeuvres near Nato members' borders with Russia, intimating nuclear threats, and deploying nuclear-capable missiles in the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad", Mr Sokolsky warns. Moscow, however, has a sharply different viewpoint as it believes that it is threatened by Nato's expansion which has shifted Nato countries' borders much closer to the Russian heartland. These fears have fuelled Russia's modernisation of its military in order to blunt the Western threat to its security.

Mr Sokolsky cautions that in a future war "Russia would attack with a much larger and heavier force", and "until US and Nato force improvement plans are implemented over the next few years, the alliance would have to repel the initial assault with a light covering force".

As a result, most Western defence experts endorse the judgment of a recent Rand study that Nato is "outnumbered, outranged and outgunned" by the Russians.

The US-Russia relationship is expected to remain adversarial owing to the perceived threats that one side poses to the other. There is a lack of trust in a highly militarised environment.

President Trump and his administration, however, have been widely seen as being close to Moscow - at least until the US missile strikes in Syria last week. But the recent White House-Kremlin friendship may well embolden Moscow to indulge in precipitous military actions in Nato countries close to the Russian border.

Mr Trump may succeed in developing good personal chemistry with Russian President Vladimir Putin, but it will not reduce perceptions of military threat on both sides because the US-Russian confrontation is much more deeply rooted in fundamental differences over interests and core values, and in each side's effort to dominate the world order.