Parade of the 'minis' on Indo-Pacific's geostrategic fashion runways

THE "mini" style of diplomacy, currently in vogue in the Indo-Pacific, resembles a fashion runway for rival great powers and their allies to showcase their latest geostrategy. Mini refers to the rise of the so-called "minilateral" alliances that are growing in popularity because large multilateral organisations have failed to achieve global cooperation.

Fleet-footed and nimble, small minilaterals seem to be the preferred route. Minilateralism, according to the scholar Moises Naim, usually involves between three and nine countries getting together to form a group that is relatively exclusive, pursues a critical mass approach, and remains flexible and functional.

A recent book edited by Bhubhindar Singh and Sarah Teo, two academics at the S Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore, entitled Minilateralism in the Indo-Pacific: The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, Lancang-Mekong Cooperation Mechanism, and Asean, interrogates the emergence of minilateralism that may prove more effective than the large multilateral arrangements.

A view gaining currency is that multilateral organisations have not been effective in cooperating globally on critical issues through each organisation's independent bureaucracies. Observers point out that multilateral talks on global issues have stalled; they have missed deadlines and they often do not stick to their commitments. Two standout instances are the collapse of the Doha Round of world trade talks, and the disappointment with the United Nation (UN)'s ability to maintain global peace and security.

In these circumstances, a small number of countries may have the "largest possible impact on solving a particular problem", argues Dr Naim. Minilaterals are not only smaller than multilateral organisations, but they are also more exclusive, flexible and functional.

The difference between minilateralism and multilateralism is visible in global trade. Whereas the World Trade Organization represents a broad multilateral enterprise, the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership is more like a minilateral entity.

ALTERNATIVE FORMS OF COOPERATION

Singh and Teo argue that while United States-centred bilateralism and Asean-led multilateralism had dominated the post-Cold War security system in the Indo-Pacific, countries have begun turning to alternative forms of cooperation, such as minilaterals, because of increasing doubts about the effectiveness of both bilateral and multilateral engagements.

Both China and the US are participating in minilaterals in the Indo-Pacific. A Chinese initiative is the Lancang-Mekong Cooperation (LMC) mechanism grouping China, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Thailand and Vietnam that was established in 2015. The US has been leading the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue since 2017, involving the US, Australia, Japan and India.

Other existing minilateral institutions are the Malacca Straits Patrol arrangement set up in 2004, consisting of Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and Singapore; and the Sulu Sea Trilateral Patrols launched by Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines in 2017. The Five Power Defence Arrangements is also considered a minilateral defence coalition, comprising Australia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore and the UK.

While minilaterals cannot entirely replace the multilateral effort towards global cooperation, they can serve in an adjunct role because they are less bureaucratic and easier to operate than the multilaterals that are much more complex and tend to conduct exhausting negotiations. Minilateral initiatives seem to be better able to address specific threats, or an urgent issue, as they involve fewer countries that espouse common interests and a desire to find a solution relatively quickly, as opposed to the slow decision-making of the multilaterals.

In the Indo-Pacific, security minilaterals have become active in response to China's occupation and construction on islands in the South China Sea. Some of these are the Quad, the India-Japan-US trilateral, and the India-France-Australia trilateral, all aimed at safeguarding the interests of countries sharing a broadly common world view.

The minilaterals are here to stay. This is because in a multipolar world defined by the geopolitical US-China rivalry, fractures have appeared in multilateral organisations, evident in the slow decision-making and reforms in the membership structure of the UN Security Council, and in the International Monetary Fund that is run by the power of the US veto.

BUT THERE ARE RISKS

The risks associated with minilateralism should be mentioned. They can erode both the importance of international organisations and accountability in global systems. It is still too early to determine whether the minilateral system, based on voluntary and non-binding commitments (not legally binding ones), will hurt global governance.

What is the impact of the Indo-Pacific minilaterals on Asean? Asean members or other regional states may either reject US minilateral security approaches as inappropriate for their own regional security planning, or may prefer to adapt variants of minilateral security which are a better fit for their own national and regional priorities.

How worried are South-east Asians about the minilaterals? A chapter in Singh and Teo's book identifies Asean's concerns about the emerging minilaterals in the region, and how minilateralism would affect Asean's unity and centrality in the regional security architecture. The majority of the people in Asean interviewed in the chapter supported the Quad Security Dialogue initiative and they value its cooperative mechanisms.

The survey found that Asean does not reject minilateral engagements because not all emerging minilaterals are competitive with, or pose a challenge to, Asean-centred regionalism. The majority of South-east Asian respondents believe that the Quad could complement Asean, rather than challenge or sideline it. The survey finds that the Quad would contribute to stability and peace in the Indo-Pacific.

China's minilateral strategy is seen in its controversial leadership of the LMC. As an upstream state on the Mekong River, China has brought the downstream Mekong riparian states under its sphere of influence by using its advantageous position through water management and construction of dams. China's strategic aim is to use the LMC to expand and deepen its influence in Indochina. Through the LMC, China uses hydro-politics as an instrument to reorder the political landscape of South-east Asia through regional cooperation and geopolitical expansion.

Minilaterals should, of course, be welcomed in both trade and security - if they can deliver the desired results. But one minilateral should not turn into an antagonistic bloc against another minilateral. The history of the two World Wars has shown how two rival alliances of countries can unleash great destruction.

• The writer is the editor-in-chief of Rising Asia Journal.