Two camps on China-US ties: Engagement Plus vs a new cold war
THE conventional wisdom in the aftermath of the signing of the Phase One trade pact between Beijing and Washington goes something like this: So this was not a peace treaty, but more like a pause in what will be a long and costly economic war between China and the United States.
Stemming from this depressing conclusion is the notion that the two governments have yet to resolve the structural economic problems that separate them, and that, in particular, the Americans are going to press China to reverse its industrial policies - or face a new cold war that would lead to the "de-coupling" of their economies. But in a way, that prediction probably describes the worst-case-scenario, infused with intellectual determinism, in the future of the Sino-American relationship. And we should recognise that there is nothing inevitable about it.
It is true that members of the political establishment in Washington (as well as many American business executives) have become more and more sceptical in recent years about the wisdom of the US' "engagement" with China, as the dream (or fantasy) of communist China being transformed into a liberal, free-market economy as a result of its integration into the global economy dissipates.
Indeed, even before a China basher became president, the growing bipartisan consensus in Washington was that the time had come to end the business-as-usual approach towards Beijing and confront its government over numerous economic and security policies issues, suggesting that growing tensions between the two countries could be expected even if a Democrat had landed in the White House. But there is a huge difference between reassessing the engagement strategy vis-à-vis China and introducing a more realistic policy on the one hand, and turning China into the new bogeyman and global threat to core US national interests on the other. The latter would require Washington and Americans to prepare for a Cold War that would end only if and when the Chinese adopt Western values and play by the rules dictated by the United States.
From that perspective, the conclusion of the Phase One trade negotiations between Beijing and Washington demonstrates that it is possible to recognise that China is not a US ally and that it should be treated as a "frenemy". This entails trying to do business with it on some issues while remaining in disagreement with it on others, without necessarily sliding into cold or hot wars between the two nations.
In that context, it seems that President Donald Trump has been under pressure from two competing camps in Washington. First, those who are ready to move gradually and on an ad-hoc basis in dealing with the disagreements between the two governments over trade and investment, as well as differences regarding Taiwan and territorial disputes in the South China Sea. Call it "Engagement Plus".
Then there is the camp which insists that China, like the former Soviet Union during the Cold War, is a clear and present danger with which America should be ready for a historic global clash, ironically including by adopting the kind of industrial policy that China is pursuing.
If re-elected, President Trump, the self-proclaimed economic nationalist who fancies himself as a deal-maker, will find himself torn policy-wise between these two camps - groups which, in any case, will continue to set the agenda in Washington even if he is replaced by a Democrat.
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