Economics takes back seat in rise of ‘Global South’

ONE of the defining features of COP28 has been the fast-growing influence of the so-called “Global South”. This is reflected in the issues discussed, and the deals made with, for instance, a landmark “loss and damage” agreement on the opening day of the climate summit.

Yet, while the concept of the “Global South” dates back six decades to the 1960s, the term’s usage has grown significantly recently, including following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and the conflict in Gaza between Israel and Hamas.

During this time, there has been much commentary on perceptions within many Global South nations of double standards of the West.

This is given the moral clamour of many Western nations against Moscow’s actions, while at the same time giving strong support for Israel’s offensive following the Hamas terrorist attacks in October, despite thousands of innocent Palestinian casualties.

The salience of the Global South badge, which some have compared to the rise of the non-aligned movement during the Cold War, has grown as other more economically-defined terms to describe some or all of this huge bloc of nations appears to have declined in usage in comparison.

Take the example of the “emerging markets” concept which, while reportedly first used in the early 1980s by the World Bank economist Antoine Van Agtmael, really took off in popularity after the end of the Cold War in the 1990s.

The concept of the Global South is a more politically-loaded term that is often defined by the perceived unfairness of the global order, and the continued preponderance of the West or Global North. This despite the clear shift in power in recent years, as COP28 shows.

Outside of global climate summitry, the Global South’s growing power has also been manifest in much wider global debates in recent times.

This includes the Ukraine war where much of the South is unaligned, in public, with either Russia or the West.

For many countries in Africa, Asia, the Middle East and Latin America, such non-alignment has significant appeal, not least as a big number of such nations depend heavily on trade, aid, investment and/or weaponry from both Western powers and from China, if not also from Russia.

Another dynamic that highlights the politically charged nature of the Global South is the growing rivalry for leadership of this group.

This includes moves by China, India (the current chair of the G20) and Brazil – the recent chair of Mercosur (a four-member Latin America bloc which also comprises Argentina, Paraguay and Uruguay).

It is in this dynamic context that moves are afoot to bring greater organisational identity to the South.

To be sure, there have long existed forums such as the G77, founded at the 1964 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, to promote a more equitable world order in the face of massive, continuing economic inequalities that are raising increased global concern.

However, the G77 is widely seen to have been surpassed by the Brics as the premier forum for the Global South.

The prestige of the Brics club, which comprises Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa, was shown at the latest annual summit in August when it was announced there had been over 20 formal requests, plus over 20 informal ones, to join the club from other Global South nations.

This led the five-nation bloc to invite a new cohort of members which has been carefully chosen, geographically and politically, to include Argentina, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. These six nations will significantly increase the bloc’s clout – collectively they account for around 30 per cent of global GDP plus over 40 per cent of global oil production.

The prestige of the Brics comes despite the fact that there is some growing scepticism of the relevance of the group as an economic club given the diverging long-term economic trajectory of the five nations.

This has seen generally robust economic performance in founder members China and India over the past decade, contrasting with disappointing results in Brazil, Russia, and South Africa.

This is one reason why Brics have tried to emphasise in recent years their political cooperation, leading some in the West worry about the group becoming an anti-Western club, not least with China and Russia (plus now Iran) amongst the membership. However, there are in fact significant tensions within the body.

Take the example of India and China which have longstanding disagreements, including over border issues, plus India is part of the so-called anti-China Quad of powers comprising the United States, Japan and Australia too. More recently, New Delhi and Beijing have disagreed over the Gaza conflict too, with India having a much more pro-Israel view than China.

With its huge economy, China under President Xi Jinping sees itself as the natural leader of the Global South, in general, and the Brics in particular. Unsurprisingly, it therefore favours the most rapid expansion of the bloc to try to create a Beijing-friendly hub.

However, both India and Brazil also have burgeoning leadership credentials over the South. This despite their greater caution about Brics expansion than China.

Prime Minister Narendra Modi, whose Bharatiya Janata Party polls indicate will win in 2024 a third term of office, leveraged his chairing of this year’s G20 to showcase India’s global influence. Part of the reason that New Delhi believes it has such claims to international leadership of the South is that many demographers believe the country may now have the world’s largest population, surpassing China.

Modi said during the 2023 G20 that his country is “becoming the voice of the Global South”. Indeed in January, he even hosted a virtual “Voice of the Global South Summit” which included 125 countries, but not regional rivals China and Pakistan.

For Brazil, meanwhile, its claim to leadership of the Global South comes under the second era of leadership of President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva. Brazil takes over the chair of the G20 from India in 2024, and Lula is looking to use this powerful platform to project further his nation’s return to the global stage after years of self-inflicted international isolation.

Taken together, this highlights the multiple ways in which politics is at the fore of the resurgence in usage of the Global South term. As the tectonic plates of international relations shift further, with an increasingly multipolar competitive landscape, this may only continue apace in the second half of the 2020s.

The writer is an associate at LSE IDEAS at the London School of Economics