EU strategy undermined by African coups

    • Gabon's military rulers have reopened the country's borders, closed in the wake of the military coup that ousted ex-president Ali Bongo.
    • Gabon's military rulers have reopened the country's borders, closed in the wake of the military coup that ousted ex-president Ali Bongo. PHOTO: AFP
    Published Mon, Sep 4, 2023 · 02:40 PM

    EUROPEAN Commission president Ursula von der Leyen has previously declared Africa a “super priority” for Brussels. However, the European Union’s (EU) policy towards the region has been undermined after last week’s eighth coup since 2020 in West and Central Africa, this time in Gabon.

    Rich in natural resources, much of Africa has widely been seen as key by many European nations to its goal of reducing economic over-dependency (what some EU politicians like von der Leyen call “de-risking”) on Russia and China, in the wake of the Ukraine war. Prior to the pandemic, the region had in the last decade made democratic gains to try to rid itself of its reputation for political putsches.

    Yet, this EU vision for Africa is threatened by the recent wave of coups which former French ambassador Gerard Araud puts down, in significant part, to “European failure”, including from France, but also others too, such as Germany and Italy. Specifically, he cites the absence of any clear European unity over a shared African strategy.

    Even the EU’s current chief diplomat Josep Borrell has admitted the coups are a “big issue for Europe that is opening up a new era of instability in a region... It’s clear that things haven’t gone well, given the proliferation of military coups and the presence of (Russian) Wagner gangs”. What Borrell refers to here is how persistent insecurity and corruption are increasingly giving rise to what Nigerian president Bola Tinubu has called a “contagion of autocracy”. In so doing, coups have gained legitimacy as the credibility of democracy has eroded with military leaders sometimes proclaiming their rule as a second independence.

    The size of the challenge is so big for Europe, in part, because of changing demographics. In the 1960s, the EU’s collective population was twice that of Africa, yet today Africa’s is almost double the EU’s size, and by 2050 it could be quadruple.

    While the EU launched what it styled as a bold new Africa plan in 2021, this has been undercut. To be sure, some in the West foresaw the political risks arising from the desertifying Sahel region and West Africa, launching multiple interventions.

    Yet this has not been enough, intensified by a wider developmental failure. To meet the United Nations’ Sustainable Development Goals, markets and governments need to generate more than US$270 billion a year in loans or aid across Africa as a whole, but this is not happening.

    This policy failure has been intensified by competitive rivalry as a range of nations challenge Europe’s former political power in Africa. From Middle Eastern and Russian initiatives in the region to the great power game underway between the United States and China, geopolitical interest in the continent is growing fast.

    Within the EU, it is France for which Africa has longest been a foreign policy priority. For almost a century and a half, France maintained a substantial empire in the continent, stretching from the Maghreb through the Western and Central sub-Saharan regions. Building from this legacy, Emmanuel Macron has sought to renew these historical relationships, but with mixed success.

    The French president is also well aware that his goal of boosting his nation’s influence across the continent is challenged by the competing attention paid by other nations to the continent. This includes not only great powers like the United States and China, but also other states such as India, Russia, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and some Gulf nations.

    One example within Europe is the United Kingdom, for which Africa has assumed new importance following Brexit, as London seeks to consolidate ties with key non-EU nations. Given the longstanding historical ties that the United Kingdom has, especially with Commonwealth countries, the government regularly cites that it wants to marry the United Kingdom’s heritage as a great global trading nation with a prosperous, growing Africa.

    Russia, under Vladimir Putin, is also keen to entrench its foothold in the continent with his nation’s trade with Africa having risen around fourfold since 2009, when the figure was US$5.7 billion. As Moscow seeks to expand its international influence, the continent is a key target for the Russian president, including for geopolitical, not just economic, reasons.

    Yet, it is the great powers that will probably have the most long-term impact on the continent, with China showing the greatest interest of all in Africa. The super priority that Beijing places on Africa is illustrated by the fact that its top leadership (the president, premier and foreign minister) has reportedly made a whopping total of around 80 visits to over 40 different countries there over the past decade alone, dwarfing that of other nations.

    China is aiming to increasingly connect its Belt and Road Initiative with the continent’s development. Moreover, trade between the two powers has risen from US$765 million four decades ago to some US$170 billion, with around 40 African countries having signed onto Belt and Road.

    Under Joe Biden, the United States is also stepping up its interest in the continent too, although the administration knows it is playing a game of “catch-up” with China. The Biden team is seeking to turbocharge US policy via the “Prosper Africa” initiative, which brings together 17 US government agencies to work on boosting trade and investment.

    The administration is framing the initiative as a way to promote shared US-Africa prosperity. Yet it is also designed, in part, to counter China in the region.

    For much of the Trump years, US policy towards Africa lacked coherency, clarity and urgency. And this was despite former key administration figures, including former national security adviser John Bolton, acknowledging that China and Russia were “interfering with US military operations and posed a significant threat to US national security interests” in the continent.

    Take the example of Kenya, whose president was one of the few African leaders invited to the White House during Trump’s presidency. It is a key US partner in the region amid insecurity and displacement in neighbouring countries including Somalia, Ethiopia and South Sudan. Yet, Kenya’s external debt is largely now owed to Beijing, and many infrastructure projects are being built by Chinese companies.

    This exemplifies that, while the upsurge of attention to Africa by Western powers and China partially reflects geopolitical considerations, broader economic calculations are also in play. From European initiatives in the region to the great power game underway between the United States and China, interest in the continent is only likely to grow, especially if its emerging markets fulfil their significant economic potential in the years to come.

    The writer is an associate at LSE IDEAS at the London School of Economics