Europe and the polycrisis

EVERY historical period is defined by its own challenges. After World War II, Europe had to find a way to end the recurring and relatively independent crises linked to market cycles, domestic politics, and great-power competition that had torn it apart for decades. It met this challenge by building stable nation states and effective welfare systems in a context of strong European and international frameworks.

Since the turn of the century, Europe has been confronting a new challenge: responding to a highly complex polycrisis, comprising a broad set of interlinked crises. Many of these crises could, on their own, prove catastrophic, owing to self-reinforcing and cumulative processes, such as climate-change tipping points and the snowball effect of public debt.

But none is unfolding in a vacuum. On the contrary, today’s interconnected crises compound and reinforce one another. For example, a demographic crisis destabilises the welfare state, undermining economic well-being, which in turn fuels social and political disruption. A significant and lasting decline in social and political cohesion can contribute to other kinds of crises, such as the current crisis of liberal democracy, while hampering states’ ability to respond to still other threats, like climate change.