Europe thinks through de-risking from the US

THE Munich Security Conference is Europe’s premier geopolitical annual summit, comparable to Singapore’s Shangri La Dialogue. Yet, at this year’s edition, which took place from Feb 13 to 15, highlights came not from the continent’s leaders, but US Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi.

While the two met to finalise arrangements for US President Donald Trump’s spring visit to China and discuss a sustainable settlement to the Ukraine war – now entering its fifth year – Munich’s real focus was Rubio’s vision for a transatlantic future, amid what the event organisers called Trump’s “wrecking ball politics”.

This follows more than a year of tensions, including US tariffs and wider economic threats against Europe, plus Trump’s constant accommodation of Russia in the Ukraine war, and sabre-rattling around his desired US acquisition of Greenland.

Overall, Rubio’s speech was more emollient than Vice-President JD Vance’s words a year ago.

Whereas Vance warned that Europe’s internal divisions were a bigger threat than Russia, Rubio asserted that America’s “destiny will always be intertwined with yours… the end of the transatlantic era is neither our goal nor our wish… we will always be a child of Europe… we belong together”.

Speaking a day after Rubio, Wang offered a pointed alternative: “China and the EU are partners, not rivals. As long as we firmly grasp this point, we will be able to make the right choices in the face of challenges, prevent the international community from moving towards division and promote the continuous progress of human civilisation.”

This rhetorical split highlights Europe’s dilemma. Notably, Rubio’s wider remarks echoed familiar Trumpian themes. He warned that the US has “no interest in being polite and orderly caretakers of the West’s managed decline”.

Tellingly, immediately after his speech, Rubio toured Slovakia and Hungary, whose populist, conservative leaders remain at odds with other EU countries on issues such as Russia, while enjoying warm ties with Trump.

Europe’s deeply bruised relations with US

Rubio’s itinerary confirms that US-Europe relations are at their most serious rupture in decades, perhaps even the post-war era.

This matters not just for these two major powers, but also the wider world, given the stakes: The EU is one of the largest US trading partners, exporting over US$600 billion in goods in 2024 and importing some US$370 billion worth.

The fallout from Trump’s Greenland remarks is tangible. The European Parliament halted legislation implementing the EU-US tariff deal agreed in July 2025. While work has resumed, it is on the new condition that the US respects European sovereignty, including a clause allowing for the suspension of tariff preferences in response to security threats, including territorial integrity.

These challenges have pushed Europe into a growing number of conversations about the need to de-risk, politically, from the US. Unquestionably, some European nations have long free-ridden on US security, as German Chancellor Friedrich Merz flagged Europe’s “holiday from history”.

Yet, much of the challenge lies with Trump’s assumption that the EU is a hostile power “formed in order to screw the United States”.

He has fixated on trade deficits – specifically in cars and farm products – even in his first presidential term. Anthony Gardner, former US ambassador to the EU under the Obama administration, warned that “Europe (needs to) wake up: the US wants to break up the EU”.

This view has also been advanced by Stephen Moore, a former economic adviser to Trump, who said the US might negotiate individually with European countries rather than as a 27-member bloc.

Trump an outlier in US history

The contrast between Trump and leading Democrats today is striking. At Munich, California Governor Gavin Newsom stressed that “Donald Trump is temporary. He’ll be gone in three years”.

Newsom went on to assert that Trump does not represent enduring American values and urged Europe to maintain partnerships with individual US states such as California.

Historically, the schism between Trump and previous US presidents, including almost all Republicans, is clear too.

At the start of European integration, the US bipartisan view was that a united Europe would make future wars in the continent less likely; create a stronger partner for the US in meeting the challenges posed by the Soviet Union; and offer a more vibrant market for building transatlantic prosperity.

Yet, US attitudes gradually became more ambivalent as European integration deepened.

In the economic arena, for instance, the drive toward the European single market led to US concerns about whether this would evolve into a “fortress Europe”. Similarly, the creation of the European Monetary Union prompted worries about the dilution of US primacy in the financial sector and macroeconomic policy.

Prior to Trump, the George W Bush administration came closest to questioning the value of European integration, disagreeing over the Iraq conflict. Donald Rumsfeld, then defence secretary, even drew a distinction between “old” and “new Europe” with the latter (mainly Eastern Europe) perceived as more favourable to US interests.

However, while the Bush team eventually retreated from this hardline approach, the Trump team may be different. This highlights the significant prospect, which markets may still underestimate, of further significant economic and/or political ruptures, even if both sides still have strong incentives to avoid them.

The writer is an associate at LSE IDEAS at the London School of Economics