Europe’s focus on Asean and wider Asia-Pacific to grow

AS EUROPE enters a big election year, the region’s domestic politics are “freezing up” in anticipation of the big ballots ahead, inside and outside the European Union. However, much foreign policy activity is under way that may significantly reshape global politics in the year ahead.

In the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the EU is conducting a fundamental reappraisal of its global relationships. In Latin America, for instance, Brussels still holds out a possibility that a major trade and investment deal can be reached in the first quarter of this year with Mercosur (Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay and Paraguay). Chief negotiators from the two blocs are hoping to meet in Brazil on Jan 25 and 26 in the latest bid to try to finalise the agreement that has been over two decades in the making.

Yet, it is another emerging markets-rich area of the world that will also be a key focal point for the EU in 2024. This includes on Feb 2, which will see the EU-Asia-Pacific forum and the EU-Asean ministerial meeting.

The upcoming summits will further lay down the framework for political and economic cooperation between the two regions based on mutual respect and equality. Discussions will centre on common challenges with respect to security, trade, global value chains, digitalisation, the green transition and energy security.

Of course, the Asia-Pacific has long been a target geography for key European nations such as France, Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. Increasingly, however, a broader range of the region’s countries, including Italy, are showing heightened interest there too.

There are several reasons behind the stronger, new European emphasis on the Asia-Pacific that has the potential to cement a meaningful, new approach.

First, 2021 saw the formal release of the EU’s new strategy towards the region, which is a key bureaucratic milestone. The aim is to bolster regional stability, security, prosperity and sustainable development, at a time of rising challenges and tensions, in a bid to uphold democracy, human rights, the rule of law and respect for international law.

Second, there is growing recognition in Europe that the Asia-Pacific will continue to be one of the most dynamic areas of the globe in the decades ahead. The region – which, if defined expansively to include from the east coast of Africa to the island nations of the Pacific Ocean – is home to about three-fifths of the world’s population. It accounts for around 60 per cent of global gross domestic product, some two-thirds of global growth, about 40 per cent of the EU’s total imports and, together with the EU, drives about 70 per cent of global trade too.

Third, and related to the prior point, is the urgent need for Europe to diversify its supply chains in the wake of the Ukraine war. There is a need to reduce dependence not only on Russia, but also China, and the Asia-Pacific will be a key part of this.

Fourth, there is increased political recognition in Europe of the need to shoulder greater global responsibility, including in what sometimes is perceived as the far-flung Asia-Pacific. There is growing awareness that the region’s policy fate is increasingly interwoven with that of Europe, and therefore of a need to try to have an impact on its affairs.

The EU’s declared approach is to foster a rules-based international order. This includes an open and fair environment for trade and investment, reciprocity, the strengthening of resilience, tackling climate change and supporting connectivity with Europe.

For Europe, all of this potentially provides a key step forward in finding strategic clarity. Yet, there are, nonetheless, remaining divisions among the EU’s 27 member countries, let alone the wider powers in the region, which may still significantly stymie the adoption of a clear, coherent Asia-Pacific approach.

One of these fault lines is differences within EU nations over the rationale of a deeper engagement with the Asia-Pacific. For powers such as Germany, this has traditionally been based around commercial motivations, with the region largely (if not exclusively) seen through an economic lens. However, there are others, including France, for whom a broader strategic framework is more relevant.

While this schism is potentially very significant, over time it is possible that more of Europe will move towards a more holistic, strategic lens for viewing its relationship with Asia-Pacific, especially if relations with China deteriorate further. To be sure, France is still the only EU nation with a permanent military presence in the region, in territories including New Caledonia and French Polynesia and the islands of Mayotte and Reunion near Madagascar.

However, other EU nations are showing increased strategic interest there, including to promote free and open maritime supply routes as required under international law. In 2021, for instance, a German warship sailed in the South China Sea for the first time since the turn of the millennium.

Last year, moreover, an Italian offshore patrol ship undertook an almost half-year deployment to the region. The vessel called at ports in 14 countries including Singapore, Indonesia and South Korea.

Within the vast Asia-Pacific geography, Europe’s diplomacy has traditionally focused on powers that are now part of the G20. This club includes China, India, Japan and Australia.

However, what a study by the European Council on Foreign Relations has underlined is how much of a sought-after location is Asean for EU countries navigating the region. Indeed, the South-east Asian club was the single most popular power for European engagement, with endorsements from 21 EU members. The reasons for this are varied, and include the fact that Europe favours a multilateral, cooperative approach to foreign policy given its own post-war history.

The EU is therefore at a pivotal point with its Asia-Pacific strategy. Big challenges remain, but the emerging market-rich mega region could potentially be a huge opportunity for Europe to deliver on its goals, securing economic and political competitive advantage into the 2030s.

The writer is an associate at LSE IDEAS at the London School of Economics