FOR a while, after the end of the Cold War, it looked like the world really might be becoming a little bit more like the fabled global village. Motivated by a belief in the power of markets, globalisation took off in the 1990s. Governments loosened controls on travel, investment and trade. In 2001 China acceded to the World Trade Organisation, turbocharging trade between Asia and the West. The changes brought many benefits, reducing poverty and inequality, and were accompanied by a growing political freedom worldwide.

They brought plenty of problems, too, and some people thought that the financial crisis of 2007-09 would provoke politicians into reforming the way things worked. Many believed that the crisis had demonstrated the dangers of free-flowing capital markets. Politicians talked about restraining housing booms, and of doing more to tame finance. Globalisation slowed; Britain voted for Brexit; then America and China embarked on a trade war. But fundamentally it continued much as before.

Now, though, a radical alternative really is taking shape. Some call it “global resilience” or “economic statecraft”. We call it “homeland economics”. The crucial idea is to reduce risks to a country’s economy – those presented by the vagaries of markets, an unpredictable shock such as a pandemic, or the actions of a geopolitical opponent. Supporters say this will produce a world that is safer, fairer and greener. This special report will argue that it will, in large part, create the opposite.