India re-engages Russia and China after Trump spat

SINCE the end of the Cold War, a cornerstone of US grand strategy in the Asia-Pacific has been warming ties with India. Yet, this trajectory is now undermined by President Donald Trump’s threat to double tariffs to 50 per cent on New Delhi over its large purchases of Russian oil.

This move threatens not only to derail bilateral ties, but also the wider credibility of US strategy, which views New Delhi’s role as a growing regional counterweight to Beijing.

The proposed US tariffs, which would kick in on Aug 27, have been called “unfair, unjustified and unreasonable” by Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s government, which has vowed to “take all actions necessary to protect its national interests”. Indian legislators, including MP Priyanka Chaturvedi, echoed this sentiment. Chaturvedi accused Trump of being a “selective bully”. She pointed out that the European Union and even the US itself continue to be significant purchasers of Russian energy. 

What Chaturvedi could also have highlighted is that China remains the largest market for Russian oil exports. However, Trump failed to threaten Beijing with additional sanctions, perhaps in part to avoid breaking a delicate US-China truce which was extended last week.

This week, senior Indian ministers will meet with their Chinese and Russian counterparts. While both trips may have been pre-scheduled, the symbolism of India engaging with both China and Russia so soon after the tariff spat with Trump is striking. 

On Tuesday (Aug 19), Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi will visit New Delhi for talks with Modi, External Affairs Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar and National Security Advisor Ajit Doval on longstanding border issues.

Following that, Jaishankar will visit Moscow on Wednesday to co-chair the annual meeting of the India-Russia Inter-Governmental Commission on Trade, Economic, Scientific and Cultural Cooperation with Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov. The commission serves as the primary platform for managing bilateral trade and energy cooperation.

The chill in US-India ties underlines how much Trump’s foreign policy is transactional and lacking any coherent grand strategy. The US president has more recently suggested a possible U-turn over the additional tariffs.

During Friday’s meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Alaska, Trump noted India was a major oil client for Russia and that a secondary tariff would be “very devastating”, before adding: “If I have to do it, I’ll do it. Maybe I won’t have to do it.”

This short-sightedness contrasts sharply with years of US strategic investment in the relationship. In the post-Cold War era, Washington has increasingly favoured a strong relationship with New Delhi. This policy held largely steady through the administrations of Democrat Bill Clinton, Republican George W Bush, Democrat Barack Obama and Democrat Joe Biden.

In 2016, Washington declared New Delhi a major US defence partner and signed the Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement (Comcasa), underpinning greater counterterrorism and defence cooperation, which then defence minister Nirmala Sitharaman claimed elevated bilateral relations “to unprecedented heights”.

Even during Trump’s first term from 2017 to 2021, he and his senior team invested much time in the relationship with India, engaging in “quad” meetings with Japan and Australia, plus joint war games. 

Yet, it is this very foundation of strategic goodwill that Trump’s current tariff threats risks rupturing.

To be sure, there remain key differences between India and Russia, plus China and India. Significant points of friction remain, especially between New Delhi and Beijing over border disputes. This may be partly why Chinese President Xi Jinping did not attend the Brazil-hosted Brics summit earlier this year, despite the officially cited reason of a scheduling conflict.

Talk of a deep alliance or triumvirate between India, Russia and China is premature, to say the least. However, there is no question that Trump has ruffled the feathers of India’s political class, creating an opening for rivals to exploit.    

Indeed, Trump’s potential new tariffs on India therefore threaten not only to derail bilateral ties, but could undermine the US’ grand strategy in Asia-Pacific, of which India is such a key part, with many US regional allies wanting to see Washington embed – not erode – US influence in the face of a rising China.

The writer is an associate at LSE IDEAS at the London School of Economics