International trade: The anti-money laundering Achilles’ heel
MONEY laundering risks in Singapore have come under intense scrutiny in recent months following the revelation of a billion-dollar money laundering scheme in Singapore. The case involving ostentatious purchases left a poor aftertaste with Singaporeans surprised at how easily billions of dollars had made their way into the country. As the country is now very much focused on tightening anti-money laundering (AML) initiatives generally, it would be an opportune time to shine some light on the insidious risks hidden in the paper documentation that underpins international trade where fraud and money laundering can flourish.
Trade fraud and trade-based money laundering
Trade fraud and trade-based money laundering often co-exist due to the same vulnerabilities in the international trade system. International trade offers a unique proposition for any fraudster – a falsified invoice or shipping document could justify unlocking millions of dollars in financing and transferring the funds across borders under the guise of legitimate trade structures. The single act of an operations staff doctoring, altering or duplicating invoices or shipping documents is all that is needed for trade fraud and trade-based money laundering to occur hidden in plain sight.
A more worrying concern for law enforcement agencies is when staggering sums of money move across a web of companies in different jurisdictions – which may be, on paper, trading counterparts but in reality are vehicles controlled by a small group of people to perpetrate the fiction of trade for the purposes of moving funds illicitly.
The nature of international trade and the fault lines between trade and finance create this vulnerability where large sums of money can move around with poor or no correlation to the actual underlying goods. This is because international trade is still predominantly paper-based, and a string of parties between the exporters and importers can obscure the ownership trail of these goods. The paper nature of the documents leaves the process susceptible to the common methods of trade-based money laundering: over/under invoicing, multiple invoicing of the same goods, over/under declarations of shipments, and false description of goods. More savvy operators have realised that simplicity might be key – instead of painstakingly creating fake shipping documents that can be discovered, using photocopies of the exact shipping papers like a bill of lading might give the appearance of involvement in a legitimate trade.
The paper documents do not just give the pretext of moving funds, they can typically be the source of funds from unsuspecting lenders. By creating invoices for goods that were never owned or overinflating the value of goods, or producing multiple invoices for the same goods, the “trader” might then avail itself to bank financing through discounting facilities. Such facilities work to provide immediate cash on a receivable or payment instrument like a letter of credit due on a later date. The net result is that a fake trade has created real cash disbursed by a bank.
For such schemes to work, they invariably require collusion between different companies or, more worryingly, a web of seemingly unrelated companies controlled by a single group of actors. With a closed loop of companies engaged in this fiction, detection can be notoriously difficult. The sums can be staggering; receivables are typically the only asset some traders hold, running into the hundreds of millions each year. These receivables can be easily monetised but difficult to verify against the actual goods traded. Between the actual exporter and importer of goods lies not just the high seas but at times, also a world of fiction where billions of dollars are generated out of thin air.
In short, the problem arises from poor, fragmented information flows, the ease of manipulation of paper documents, and the use of corporate vehicles to mask illicit activities.
Ground-up solution: Nominee directors and whistleblowing
The solution requires a multi-strategy approach. On a macro-level, the authorities in Singapore have been pro-active in pushing for data-sharing platforms for international trade alongside a digitalisation drive. Such initiatives, such as SGTraDex, should create much needed transparency on asset movements and by extension, the related money flows. Even with the infrastructure in place, effecting changes in behaviour would still be slow without the necessary legislation to direct users to digitalise.
But a more effective solution to this menace comes from a ground-up approach by focusing on the individuals who are in the driving seats of these corporate vehicles. Fraudsters need companies to create the mirage of arms’ length dealings, and a company needs individuals to carry out its acts – even if for falsifying accounts, doctoring documents or signing off on financial statements.
Singapore’s business-friendly approach means companies can be incorporated by locals and foreigners in a matter of days, with the minimum legal requirement being the appointment of a local resident director, in effect to be answerable to the authorities for the actions of a foreign-owned Singapore company. A nominee director is in a curious position. He or she acts as the face of the company, signing accounts and documents but is typically not involved in any operations of the company. For a fee, a Singaporean can lend his or her name as a nominee director, sometimes even with an indemnity from the company.
Recent crackdowns by the authorities have given a glimpse of the proliferation of nominee directors, where in one case a local resident was a nominee director of 980 companies at the same time. It is one of the most striking contrasts in our line of work, to see frauds perpetrated by foreign individuals using Singapore companies with local nominee directors, many of whom are modest people living in public housing, unaware of how they might have unwittingly aided some dubious actions by the companies they have been asked to be a director of.
The authorities have astutely noticed this vulnerability in our business-friendly environment – acting on the recommendations of the Financial Action Task Force, proposals to amend Singapore laws are being considered to address such AML vulnerabilities. Among them are the introduction of a Corporate Service Providers Bill and proposed changes to the Companies Act to require nominee directors and shareholders to disclose their nominee status and identify their nominators which Acra, the Accounting and Corporate Regulatory Authority, will make publicly available. For experts dealing in trade fraud like us, such changes could not come fast enough and would shine much needed light on the dark corners of trade.
Removing the ease in which corporate vehicles are used to facilitate illicit activities goes hand in glove with prosecution of local and foreign individuals involved in trade fraud. In the aftermath of a collapsed insolvent company accused of falsifying documents, there may be little impetus to investigate individuals who are responsible and prosecute them. Foreign actors may simply vanish while local ones reinvent themselves under the auspices of a different company. Without rigorous prosecution, there is little reason to expect behaviours to change at the individual level, notably those who appear content to leave the corporate shell carrying the can of liability for their acts.
Reducing vulnerabilities in our corporate regime is one useful approach that Singapore can embark on but why not empower the very individuals who are made to execute these illicit tasks? Pav Gill’s remarkable story of his whistleblowing experience of Wirecard’s fraud is a stark reminder that behind every company’s embezzlement of funds or overstating of assets, is an employee who knows wrongdoing is being committed.
In every commodities fraud case I have been involved in, empowering the individuals pressured to falsify information with a protected avenue to whistleblow could have made all the difference. To that end, a robust national whistleblowing regime would put the power back into the hands of the very people who might feel unfairly pressured to commit wrongs – and in so doing, protect not just their interests, but the national interests of Singapore as a trade and financial hub as well.
The writer is managing director of BlackStone & Gold, a commodities and international trade law firm. He specialises in trade fraud and can be reached at baldevbhinder@blackstonegold.com