UK and France forge new alliance over backing Ukraine – and aim to bring Nato with them

ONE hundred and twenty years after the Entente Cordiale, the United Kingdom and France are forging a new alliance.

The original 1904 agreement paved the way for a stronger bilateral relationship; this time, the nations aim to use their partnership to patch up the European commitment to Ukraine and exert pressure on the United States.

In a recent letter to The Telegraph, British Foreign Secretary David Cameron and his French counterpart Stephane Sejourne, minister for Europe and foreign affairs, highlighted both the “enduring commitment to our friendship” and their success in together having “helped to forge a better world”.

But the stakes now are high. War continues to rage in Ukraine. The US’ hard power commitment remains fallible, and its US$60 billion of financial support was stuck in Congress until just last week.

Europe’s response meanwhile remains fragile, with divisions and disunity threatening both the European Union and transatlantic responses.

Can the Anglo-French alliance inspire fresh commitments from other nations?

Cameron and Sejourne certainly think so. They suggest that they can “seize together the opportunities offered by our partnership”.

More significantly, as cardinal components of Nato, they have “a responsibility in driving the alliance to deal with the challenges before it”; first, by demanding an enhanced commitment from European and US allies and, second, by pushing harder for improved European security structures.

British and French support

Since Russia’s February 2022 invasion of Ukraine, both the UK and France have arguably been stalwart supporters of providing Ukraine with the full scope of its requirements to defend its sovereign territory. This has included the provision of lethal weapons, aid, training and finance, supported by diplomatic commitment.

The UK, for example, has been responsible for two substantial projects to provide Ukraine with military assistance since the invasion of Crimea in 2014. Operation Orbital involved intensively training 22,000 troops from the armed forces of Ukraine, bringing both their infantry and medic skills to Nato’s standards.

Operation Interflex significantly improved Ukraine’s anti-armour capabilities before the invasion and has since provided further concentrated aid and training, totalling more than US$5 million across 2022 and 2023.

The UK has also worked alongside nine other international partners, enabling more than 17,000 Ukrainian recruits to complete a five-week training course in the UK, while establishing a wider international effort to train a further 67,000 Ukrainian troops in more than 30 countries.

Together the UK and France have pressured the EU, and Germany in particular, into groundbreaking commitments of military aid.

In doing so, the UK has become a strategic pacesetter in its provision of increasingly sophisticated weapons systems to Kyiv, including Challenger 2 main battle tanks, announced in January 2023 – motivating Germany to commit Leopard 2 tanks less than a fortnight later.

UK and Dutch support recently triggered the construction of a new international aerial coalition, including the US, to procure F-16 fighter jets for Ukraine in the first instance and, in the longer term, enable better coordination with Nato allies.

While Britain and France have supported Ukraine with cutting-edge hardware, including Storm Shadow cruise missiles, the question is whether their own commitment is sufficiently influential to draw others to emulate them.

There are decent examples. The Storm Shadow pledge placed significant pressure on the US to step up its own donations of Army Tactical Missile Systems, and pushed Germany to commit Taurus cruise missiles – although German Chancellor Olaf Scholz has stalled on the latter.

But there are also worrying gaps. Delays by the US House of Representatives in approving the US$60 billion aid package have fuelled ongoing anxiety that the US may simply elect to draw down its commitments, and ultimately withdraw its support for Europe as a whole, under a possible second Trump administration.

Delays from Germany and disagreements among EU countries over anti-Russian sanctions – as well as the ongoing strain of high energy prices and diminishing military stockpiles – may also take their toll on the EU’s overall appetite for ongoing support for Ukraine.

The consequences of uneven European defence are serious, with even “Ukraine’s most ardent European backers struggling to prevent the Western effort becoming fractured and piecemeal”, according to Samir Puri, a geopolitical expert and former Foreign Office representative to the Ukraine.

Leading the way

Britain and France could capitalise on their leadership to coordinate the war effort in terms of defence and diplomacy by keeping allies in the fight, now and in the medium term.

This includes everything from providing immediate supplies of weapons to Ukraine itself, to making sure the UK and EU training missions for the Ukrainian armed forces work together.

In the longer term, the overarching security guarantees that the UK, France and the EU can provide for Ukraine, along with the US, will dictate the transition from war to ceasefire and beyond.

Such guarantees could shore up the transatlantic aspect of the conflict, as far as US commitment is concerned, and serve to stimulate both the EU and Nato to support more explicit defence initiatives.

While avoiding the temptation for geopolitical point-scoring, the UK can reap diplomatic dividends that allow it to continue demonstrating its post-Brexit roles and responsibilities.

The next few months offer important opportunities for this Anglo-French alliance to make its case. This includes the European Political Community Summit, to be held on Jul 18 at Blenheim Palace in the UK. The Nato summit in Washington from Jul 9 to 11 will also be key.

In addition, there are ongoing meetings of the Ukraine Defense Contact Group, in which the US and its European allies agree to supply material and moral support to Ukraine.

Post-Brexit, France needs to clarify its own leadership ambitions: both by doing the EU’s institutional heavy lifting, and, more importantly, by making it explicit that the EU needs to bet big on a defence agenda.

The UK, in turn, is considering its post-Brexit and transatlantic role, with recent increases in defence spending serving as a way to urge European Nato allies to follow suit.

The UK and France partnership on Ukraine has the potential to add pressure on European groups and transatlantic forums to which they both belong, in order to try and secure Europe’s borders and to make sure that Ukraine has the military power to continue pushing back against Russia’s territorial land grab.

The writer is head of the department of politics at the University of Surrey