Ukraine war settlement speculation soars as Munich conference nears

ALMOST three years after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the fighting on the battlefield between pro-Moscow and pro-Kyiv forces remains intense. Yet, speculation is soaring over a settlement of the conflict, which will be a key topic at the Munich Security Conference taking place from Friday (Feb 14) to Sunday.

To be sure, US President Donald Trump’s administration has dismissed the growing reportage that it will present at the event a much-anticipated plan to end the war. However, Trump’s special representative for Ukraine and Russia, Keith Kellogg, has confirmed that there is “a good, solid plan” that has been developed.

This plan reportedly includes freezing current battle lines, which would leave Moscow in control of at least around 20 per cent of the February 2022 geography of Ukraine. In exchange, Kyiv would be given Western security guarantees to try to help ensure that Russia won’t attack again.

Potentially soon after the Munich conference, Kellogg may make his first trip to Kyiv and key European capitals. Meanwhile, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky could travel to the Gulf region to build diplomatic support there.

Trump would reportedly threaten Moscow with even greater US sanctions if President Vladimir Putin doesn’t engage in negotiations. Moreover, Kellogg has indicated that Washington would like to see new presidential elections in Ukraine after any ceasefire.

From a business perspective, it is reported that Trump wants favourable US access to Ukrainian critical minerals in return for support for a settlement.

More broadly, there is the huge issue of the future role of Russian gas in the post-war European energy mix.

Since Moscow’s invasion, the European Union has sharply increased its focus on energy security, reaching many new gas deals with the United States and Middle Eastern countries in particular. However, as EU leaders prepare for a potential deal between Moscow and Kyiv, the thorny question of cheaper Russian gas looms large again.

To be sure, the new EU Energy and Housing Commissioner Dan Jorgensen has pledged to end the bloc’s energy ties with Russia by 2027. Yet, there is a debate under way in Brussels on whether Russia’s pipeline gas sales to Europe should be restarted as part of any war settlement.

Proponents of such a move assert that it could help boost Europe’s economic competitiveness. Gas prices in Europe are often three to four times higher than in the US. However, the discussions have already prompted fury from some key players who remain the staunchest opponents of Putin. This includes the Baltic states, Poland, and Slovenia.

For as long as Putin remains in power, which is most likely till at least the 2030 Russian presidential election, Moscow will be seen by much of Europe as a pariah state. For sure, some EU countries including Hungary, Slovakia, and Bulgaria, may significantly increase their energy reliance again on Moscow. However, it is likely that many current European leaders will resist.

This could change, potentially, once Putin is no longer Russian president, especially if a new, reforming, pro-Western leadership comes into power. But that is far from assured.

So, even if the Ukraine war ends, some EU sanctions against Russia will likely remain while Putin remains in power. Before Russia invaded Ukraine, Western sanctions were already in place for international law violation, including the 2014 annexation of Crimea.

The backstory for this debate is the EU-27’s pivot away from Russian energy, even though liquefied natural gas (LNG) imports from Russia to Europe remain stubbornly high. Within a year of Moscow’s invasion, the EU’s energy consumption changed so rapidly that Russia was no longer the bloc’s main gas supplier.

Correspondingly, the EU-27 have taken on more aggressively the challenge of diversifying to new energy sources. The RePowerEU strategy is being delivered – in part – by scaling up the use of clean energy and reducing overall energy consumption. However, while the EU is eager to expand clean energy, current volumes fall far short of meeting full needs.

So to reduce reliance on Russian energy, the EU has secured many new deals since 2022. The European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) Energy Deals Tracker shows that the bloc has mostly focused on securing new gas supplies as a transitional energy source in a long-term movement towards clean energies. Around 45 per cent of the roughly 180 agreements that the bloc and its member states have struck since 2022 concern gas.

The ECFR tracker also shows, as at February 2025, that the EU country which has struck the most deals is Germany (43), more than double that of Italy (21) and Hungary (20). This is unsurprising, given that Germany is the bloc’s largest economy and was the biggest importer of Russian gas before the war. Other countries that have recorded double digits in terms of the number of energy deals struck include France, Bulgaria and Greece, at 10 each.

Of the around 180 agreements, the leading national counterparties are the US (35) and the United Arab Emirates (24), followed by Norway (14), Azerbaijan (12), Qatar (11), Algeria (10), Egypt (8), Serbia (5), the United Kingdom (5), Saudi Arabia (4), Turkey (4), Russia (4), Australia (4), Libya (3) and South Korea (3). Japan is one of the countries which has signed two deals, alongside Israel, India, Iceland, South Africa, Nigeria, Morocco, Namibia, Oman, Georgia, Angola, and Ukraine.

That the US tops this list is reflected in the significantly larger share of the EU’s LNG that the country now provides. This comes in a context too where Trump has urged Europe to buy even more US gas to ward off potential new US tariffs under his administration.

In this context, it is questionable if it would make sense for Trump to push hard for Russian gas imports to the EU in any Moscow-Kyiv peace deal as it would go against US LNG export interests. With the US having taken over as Europe’s top LNG supplier, letting more Russian gas back in would hurt its market share.

One other key factor in this debate is that Europe’s energy diplomacy has gone a long way to help deliver energy security for the bloc. However, it is complicating the EU’s energy transition which is key given its ambition to become the first net-zero region by 2050.

In part, this is because the new European gas infrastructure that has been invested in will require a medium to longer-term horizon to secure value for money. So EU nations will need to do much more now to invest in clean energy systems and amenities if they are to fully deliver on decarbonising their economies, sustainably, and meet their climate goals.

The writer is an associate at LSE IDEAS at the London School of Economics