US-led critical minerals initiatives undercut by Trump
His recent moves against Greenland and Venezuela undercut the trust needed among allies to make such global partnerships work
THERE is a growing perception in much of the West that major initiatives centred around critical minerals are necessary, in that they can shift these resources from being a sectoral challenge to a macro-strategic problem.
The critical minerals summit held by US Secretary of State Marco Rubio on Wednesday (Feb 4) in Washington DC is the latest in a string of American initiatives aimed at countering China’s dominance in these supply chains.
The International Energy Agency (IEA) and other key bodies have consistently warned that the concentration of critical minerals is a major issue in the value chain. While mining is heavily concentrated in a small number of countries, downstream processing – complex, resource-intensive and highly specialised – is even less diversified.
Yet, the irony is President Donald Trump and key administration officials are simultaneously undercutting the legitimacy of US-led initiatives that could be a key part of the solution.
Following Trump’s rhetoric in January towards Greenland, and also the US apprehension of ex-president Nicolas Maduro in Venezuela, the global context in 2026 has shifted significantly. Trump’s apparent disregard for international law and sovereignty has undercut confidence among key allies about building partnerships.
These allies include those in Europe who, facing the trauma of diversifying from Russian energy, are increasingly wary of concentration risks in global supply chains for critical minerals.
New US initiatives unveiled
These key dynamics shaped the US-convened critical minerals summit:
To be sure, a significant number of allies, including key members of the Pax Silica group of US allies, signed the Framework Agreement on Cooperation on Critical Minerals Sourcing and Processing.
The new US-led framework includes standards for government and private investment in mining, processing and recycling, as well as price guarantees to protect producers from unfair trade policies. The core of the agreement mirrors earlier deals signed with Australia and India, and various memoranda of understanding signed with Thailand and Malaysia.
However, several other powers, including in Europe, hedged their bets. Others, such as resource-rich Denmark, chose not to attend the big event at all, following recent disagreements with the Trump team over Greenland.
This is a major headache for Europeans because there is merit in some of the Trump team’s ideas. On Feb 2, the president announced a new strategic mineral initiative, Project Vault, which has been compared to the Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR) created after the 1973 oil price shock, when the Arab oil embargo sent fuel prices soaring across the West.
Under Project Vault, the US will partner with allied countries to create a supply chain for the 60 minerals that the US Geological Survey defines as “vital to the US economy and national security, and which face potential risks from disrupted supply chains”. These include antimony (used in munitions), samarium (aircraft engines) and germanium (essential to fibre-optics).
The geopolitical angle is clear. Project Vault aims to reduce mineral supply-chain risks after China, which has a near-monopoly on rare earths, retaliated against US tariffs last year by imposing stricter export controls. This tightened supplies, causing manufacturers to slow domestic production in the US.
Funding from this new US-led public-private effort includes some US$10 billion from the US government’s Export-Import Bank, alongside around US$1.66 billion in private seed funds, for the acquisition and storage of critical minerals. Like the SPR, Trump’s stockpile has the potential to be a relief valve to buffer price shocks and shortages that could cripple key industries and potentially the wider macro economy.
Currently, the US government has a limited stockpile of minerals for the defence sector’s use. However, Project Vault is a much bigger initiative involving multiple manufacturing and tech firms, including Boeing, Corning, General Electric, General Motors, Google, Stellantis and Vernova.
The involvement of the private sector is key, as bodies including the IEA have advocated for a cross-cutting public, private and third-sector dialogue, to discuss risks and identify solutions for ensuring secure and fair energy transitions while enhancing global energy security.
If this is done well, governments and industry can work together to develop responsible, sustainable critical mineral supply chains for a double win: Not only will they diversify global supply chains, they can also enhance local economic prosperity and protect ecosystems in resource-rich nations too.
European scepticism, despite continental challenges
The importance of this agenda was showcased at COP30 last November, when critical minerals featured on the climate event’s agenda for the first time. The IEA’s Global Critical Minerals Outlook 2025 report has particularly highlighted Europe’s vulnerability.
On Monday, Feb 2, the European Court of Auditors said the EU’s efforts to diversify its imports of metals and minerals critical to technology, defence and the energy transition had “yet to produce tangible results”.
The auditor report outlined a grim outlook: “Seven out of 26 materials needed for the energy transition have recycling rates between 1 and 5 per cent, while 10 are not recycled at all... Processing capacities – for which the EU aims to reach 40 per cent of its consumption by 2030 – are shutting down, partly due to high energy costs which can seriously hamper competitiveness.”
Despite more than a dozen major new trade deals, including the deal with India announced last week, and continuing efforts led by the European Commission to diversify the supply of key minerals, the overall assessment is that the bloc is “unlikely to succeed in time”. This is a damning conclusion.
The critical mineral diversification agenda will be a more challenging task than Europe’s pivot from Russia energy. A long-term agenda is much needed, built around trust-based diplomacy and cross-sectoral dialogue, to ensure real wins.
The writer is an associate at LSE IDEAS at the London School of Economics
