Why EU is hampered in global green race
EUROPE has long seen itself as the pre-eminent global centre for the green industrial revolution, with measures such as the European Union (EU) Emissions Trading System through to the Green Deal and RepowerEU schemes. Yet there is a growing sense in the continent that its edge in this “race” is imperilled. Through assertive industrial strategies, the United States and China are recognising the massive upfront costs of the energy transition in a bid to dominate the green economy of the future.
While the US$369 billion climate change component of the US Inflation Protection Act (IRA) has been in the EU’s firing line in recent weeks, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen spent much more time focusing on China in her keynote address at the World Economic Forum last month.
The European Commission accuses Beijing of using “unfair” and “market distorting” subsidies to advance in the clean technology race. Solar is sometimes held up as a warning, given that technology developed in the EU has been used to build a Chinese industry that today accounts for 80 to 95 per cent of the global supply chain.
Yet it is the IRA that has sent shockwaves across Europe in recent months, with its massive subsidies for US green industries in areas from renewable power to electric cars. Key EU politicians and firms assert that the IRA discriminates against firms exporting to the US and fear it will lure over a critical mass of their firms, costing jobs and shuttering factories in the green tech sector.
Already in recent months, Swiss solar component manufacturer Meyer Burger has announced the opening of a plant in Arizona, raising concerns about expansion of its German operations. Spanish utility Iberdrola released a three-year 47 billion-euro investment plan, with just under half to be spent in the US. Swedish battery developer Northvolt is pausing its German expansion and looking to the US instead. Germany’s Bosch has invested around half a billion dollars in US electric motor and battery production since the IRA was passed.
To be sure, the EU is still widely seen as ahead of the US in rolling out green tech. However, the IRA means the US is now the most attractive investment environment for several key industries.
It is in this concerning context of change that von der Leyen on Wednesday (Feb 1) announced a series of measures – leaked earlier in the week – such as loosening state aid rules and a new European sovereignty fund. The latter is intended to preserve the EU’s competitive advantage on critical and emerging technologies, including biotechnology and clean tech.
Potentially powerful as the new measures might be, however, the EU is hampered vis-a-vis China and the US in this global green race. That is in part because the bloc’s industrial policy is fragmented across its 27 countries, with the energy crisis post-Ukraine potentially widening those gaps.
Take the example of relaxing state aid. This concerns not just fiscal hawks like the Netherlands, but also southern and smaller European governments that lack the deep pockets of the EU’s most powerful member states, especially France and Germany.
According to recent data from the European Commission, Paris and Berlin together accounted for almost 80 per cent of all state aid given to companies since the coronavirus pandemic began.
Germany had over 356 billion euros in economic support green-lighted by the European Commission – more than half of the overall total – while France got about a quarter, around 160 billion euros. Italy was third, securing approval for just 7 per cent of the total, and Denmark stood in fourth place. The rest of the bloc collectively accounts for less than 12 per cent of the remaining state aid approved by the Commission, about 78 billion euros.
France is therefore – unsurprisingly – at the vanguard of wanting a stronger ‘Made in Europe’ green industrial policy. But Italy is not alone in calling for this to happen via a joint EU fund to help green tech across the bloc, and for looser state aid rules to “not be a free-for-all”.
Meanwhile, fiscally conservative nations like the Netherlands want Brussels to first use unspent billions from the bloc’s Covid recovery plans – an 800 billion-euro mega-measure that includes green transition efforts – before commissioning further funds.
While the intra-bloc differences on these issues are real, they may soon shrink, given the growing warnings that Europe’s industrial base could end up structurally uncompetitive, especially if high energy costs persist. Energy-intensive industries such as aluminium, fertilisers, and chemicals are at particular risk of permanently shifting production to where cheap energy abounds – for instance, natural gas in the US costs about a fifth what firms pay in Europe.
Of course, European industry has been shifting production to locations with cheaper labour and lower other costs for decades, but the energy crisis appears to be accelerating this exodus. Europe became a net importer of chemicals for the first time ever in 2021. More than half of Europe’s production of ammonia, a key ingredient in fertilisers, has been replaced by imports.
Also at risk are Europe’s efforts to secure supplies of key minerals used in electric vehicles and renewable infrastructure.
Brussels will soon propose new legislation – the European Critical Raw Materials Act – to build up reserves of minerals indispensable in the transition to a greener economy, such as lithium, bauxite, nickel, and rare earths. Yet without more renewable power and lower costs, companies may be significantly less likely to invest in Europe.
Besides high energy costs post-Ukraine, other issues will also need to be addressed by Brussels. One of these may be the EU’s traditional high reliance on carbon pricing as its key tool for stamping out emissions, with its reluctance to wield capital to drive the green transition, in a more active industrial policy.
While the final form of Europe’s counter-attack is not yet fixed in stone, the political imperative to act is growing. Differences will remain across the bloc, but there is collective determination to try to restore a level playing field with the US and China to preserve Europe’s economic attractiveness in the global green race.
The writer is an associate at LSE IDEAS at the London School of Economics.