Why 'Global Britain' may be a pipe dream

UK Prime Minister Boris Johnson launched in March a long-awaited new integrated international relations review to propel his vision for "Global Britain". Yet, the United Kingdom's place in the world remains contested to such an extent post-Brexit that this is challenged on multiple fronts.

UK politics is traditionally dated from watershed elections such as 1945 which saw Labour sweep Winston Churchill from power, or the arrival of Thatcherism in 1979. Both overturned settled ways of Britain's government, economy and society.

Brexit is seen - by some - as being a similar watershed. However, instead of a new consensus, it may be dissensus that defines UK politics more going forward.

This is not just because of uncertainty over foreign policy. Domestically, there are not just challenges to internal unity with Scotland and Northern Ireland's place in the union increasingly being debated, but also a constitution and party system in a state of flux making it significantly harder for a major new settlement to emerge.

The "consensuses" that followed 1945 and 1979 were the product of changes long in the pipeline that connected to wider international trends, such as the Great Depression, the end of the World War II, or the collapse of Bretton Woods. Each reset reflected problems in the previous international system.

However, even these revolutions were by no means complete, nor fully accepted. Despite Margaret Thatcher's governments, UK state spending remains relatively high by international comparisons, even before the pandemic began, and the nation's relative decline - which the "Iron Lady" sought to "reverse" - remains real to many.

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Mr Johnson wants to use the exit from the European Union (EU) to change the UK's political economy, identity, and place in the world by using Brexit to rebalance the economy and pursue his Global Britain agenda. While his big victory in the 2019 general election gave this agenda a fillip, his often-inept handling of the pandemic has eroded some of his political capital, despite the successful UK vaccination roll-out.

With few fixed principles or ideology, a habit of disregarding detail in favour of showmanship, plus the problems that the pandemic has brought, he is finding it difficult to lead, let alone sustain, a coherent, lasting consensus. The result, following the still-divisive 2016 referendum, is that instead of a defining narrative, Britain's sense of itself and place in the world remain contested.

The 1945 and 1979 resets revolved largely around political economy, and Mr Johnson hopes this could be true in the 2020s too. One key debate here is around rebalancing the UK economy with some Brexiteers favouring a so-called "Singapore-on-Thames" model of international trade and deregulation.

Imbalances in the economy have long been a concern in UK politics. Mr Johnson wants to use Brexit to expedite "levelling-up" by reaching out to "left behind" cohorts, including in the English Midlands and North where Conservatives made historic electoral in-roads in 2019.

However, the outcome in terms of a potential new economic model remains unclear. Conservatives have long struggled to balance a commitment to globalisation and international trade with sovereignty and nationalism.

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And the embrace of some Brexiteers of a Singapore-on-Thames approach also faces a number of problems. It can misread Singapore where state involvement can still be significant.

Moreover, the economic costs and disruption of moving to such a model may well hit hardest the disadvantaged communities it is supposedly designed to help. Yet another third challenge is that the UK tax burden is now the highest level since the late 1960s to pay for around £400 billion (S$742 billion) of pandemic-related spending.

Another critical choice will be to what extent the UK should be a European-aligned economy. Many Brexiteers argue that diverging from the EU will boost growth by developing links with key emerging markets such as China and India, plus longstanding industrialised economies like Canada and Australia.

Some divergence is inevitable as the UK and EU economies evolve. However, the UK's ability to then leverage this, in the short term at least, can be overplayed. Some Brexiteers themselves have argued this point inasmuch as new UK trade deals are only a means to an end and that the economy needs to be better configured to benefit from them.

Brexiteers are increasingly trying to articulate where they want the UK to diverge from the EU. So far their efforts to do so have been found wanting, however, in part because Europe will probably continue to be the UK's main trading partner, a situation that historically only changed when the world economy descended into protectionism with Britain opting for imperial preferences.

One option for divergence is greater alignment with the United States. A trade deal with Washington has long been one of Mr Johnson's goals. Yet, this is not the priority for the Biden administration that it was for the Trump team. Plus the structure of the UK economy, the costs of change, and the continued pull of the EU as a regulatory superpower may temper such ambitions.

So, despite the significant change that Brexit will bring, it is far from sure that Mr Johnson will forge the sweeping new political, social, and economic settlement he desires. Moreover, the "window of opportunity" to act may be narrowing, fast, almost two years into his premiership.

• The writer is an associate at LSE IDEAS at the London School of Economics.