Will COP complicate soft power deficit problem for China?

CHINA has enjoyed in recent years a reputation as a state which is deeply committed to the climate change agenda, yet it has received significant criticism for the failure of President Xi Jinping to show up at the ongoing COP26 summit.

"China can do more, and it should," said Tina Stege, climate ambassador for the Marshall Islands, which could soon submerge underneath the rising Pacific Ocean. These comments were underscored by Alf Wills, a former chief COP negotiator for South Africa, who said that other developing nations were loath to publicly criticise Beijing on this issue given that Chinese diplomats can be instrumental in delivering funding for them.

Yet, it is the United States that has been most forceful in its critique with Joe Biden's national security adviser, Jake Sullivan, asserting that the Chinese are 'significant outliers' among countries that have made commitments in an attempt to limit warming to 1.5 degrees Centigrade, as agreed in Paris in 2015.

He asserted that Beijing had "an obligation to step up to greater ambition as we go forward" and that China is "a big country with a lot of resources and a lot of capabilities" which is "perfectly capable of living up to their responsibilities".

Washington has been particularly critical of Beijing, the world's biggest emitter, for not making any major new climate pledges at COP26.

To be sure, China has previously pledged to hit peak carbon emissions by 2030 and be carbon-neutral by 2060.

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Yet, it's still planning to increase the amount of coal it burns over the next five years. Moreover, Beijing still hasn't set any specific targets on exactly when carbon emissions will peak, at what level, and how quickly they will decrease after.

While Sullivan's critique needs to be seen in the context of the current tensions in US-China relations, the fact that other countries share at least some of his sentiment risks exacerbating the soft power challenges that Beijing already faces which has the potential to become a growing headache for the ruling Communist Party in the 2020s.

China cares deeply about its international image and, according to David Shambaugh, a sinologist at George Washington University, the nation spends some US$10 billion a year as part of a soft power campaign.

COP26 aside, a significant driver of China's soft power problems is, ironically, its very success in rapidly becoming a nascent superpower. Indeed, the nation's rise to greater prominence has been one of the defining features of the post-Cold War period, and this has been reinforced by major trade and diplomatic forays such as the 'Belt and Road' initiative.

Take the example of Beijing's growing economic power. IMF data since 2014 has asserted that the nation's economy is now larger than its US counterpart on a purchasing power parity basis which adjusts for the fact that goods are cheaper in China and other countries relative to the United States.

However, the consequences of the country's generally strong growth in recent decades have been more than economic. In terms of perceptions, many internationally believe that the global balance of power has swung very significantly.

And this is having important, real-world implications, including feeding into political posturing of some populist politicians such as former US president Donald Trump with his claims that Beijing has employed a range of unfair trade practices, including currency manipulation. Frequently, he attacked China in a way that however ill judged, got domestic US traction.

Beyond Trump, there has been a stark change in international perceptions towards Beijing as underlined by Pew Global Research. A significant number of nations now assert that China is the world's "leading economic power".

Much of the reason for these changed perceptions of China's strength stem from the aftermath of the 2008-09 financial crisis. While much of the developed world subsequently recovered, at a sometimes slow pace, from the worst economic downturn for a generation, China has enjoyed mostly strong growth, and was last year the only G20 country to grow during the pandemic.

While welcomed by many in China who understandably like recognition of the country's growing might, this opinion shift is not without headaches for Beijing. For, as Trump's often misinformed rhetoric showed, it has exposed the country to greater foreign scrutiny and fed into perceptions, seized upon by politicians, tapping into concern about China's rise.

This is problematic for Beijing on multiple levels. For one, the country's grand strategy has long been premised on a gradual, peaceful transition to power during which it will grow stronger while keeping a low profile.

The significantly brighter spotlight on the country, especially since 2008, has exposed a deficit of soft power which is complicating its rise to power. Soft power, which rests upon the international attractiveness of a country's foreign policy, political values and culture, is recognised by Beijing as a key political commodity, but one it has had limited success in cultivating to date.

As international perceptions of the country's power have changed, its global favourability has shown weakness in multiple key countries, as underlined in Pew Research Center. And this has been exacerbated by the pandemic.

According to a recent survey conducted by Pew in 14 different countries, a median of 61 per cent of respondents say China has done a bad job dealing with the outbreak. Confidence in Xi also fell in surveyed countries with the poll showing a median of 78 per cent of those surveyed have little or no confidence in the leader.

Especially if critical scrutiny intensifies, Beijing must find better ways to tackle this soft-power deficit, including enhanced international public diplomacy to win more foreign 'hearts and minds'.

At a symbolic level, example measures include utilising the country's growing capabilities in science and technology for international cooperation with surveys underlining that many around the world admire China's strength in these important areas.

Beijing should also restart a process of addressing foreign concerns about its intentions as a rising power. Here, it could intensify efforts to be seen as a responsible, peaceful global stakeholder. And match this rhetoric with actions.

In the post-pandemic era to come, this agenda will pose significant challenges. However, unless it is tackled, China's soft power deficit could only grow bigger in the 2020s.

• The writer is an associate at LSE IDEAS at the London School of Economics