Considering a Sino-American ‘beautiful deal’: Could China and the US divide the world?

IN THE aftermath of the Cold War, following the integration of China into the global system and the growing diplomatic engagement between the world’s two largest economic superpowers, there was some discussion promoted by realpolitik-types such as Henry Kissinger and Zbigniew Brzezinski about the likelihood of creating power-sharing agreements between Beijing and Washington.

Indeed, the notion of a G2 (or Group of Two) of these two superpowers, proposed by Brzezinski and Fred Bergsten of the Peterson Institute for International Economics, as members of the UN Security Council, and as the most prominent rising power and the strongest status-quo power, working together to address the big challenges facing the international system and providing the global public goods that the world required, became quite popular, until it wasn’t.

As some suggested, under the conditions of rapid international power transition, when the rising power would inevitably challenge the status quo and the position of the state or states that were securing the established order, rivalry between Washington and Beijing was more likely.

But at a time when the international system is increasingly dominated by the competition between the three big powers – the US, Russia and China – perhaps the time has come to revisit the idea of a G2.

It’s true that leading foreign policy aides to President Donald Trump – from national security adviser Mike Waltz, to Secretary of State Marco Rubio – not to mention the majority of Republicans and Democrats, are China hawks who have called for an aggressive posture versus Beijing, including by committing the US to protect Taiwan.

But then, President Trump, the dealmaker, is now promoting a deal with Russian President Vladimir Putin, who just until a few months ago was seen as America’s major global adversary.

Indeed, from Trump’s perspective, might is right, and the big powers have the right, if not the obligation, to govern the international system, with the rest of the world being required to follow the rules designed by the powerful players.

So why shouldn’t Trump be enticed by “a big, beautiful deal” with China’s leader, Xi Jinping, that runs counter to campaign-trail vows to hit China with crippling tariffs? Such a bargain could package economic tradeoffs with dividing the world into spheres of influence.

Trump, challenging the conventional wisdom in Washington, has questioned whether TikTok, a Chinese-owned app, really harms American national security, invited China to help with peacemaking in Ukraine, and said that he would rather not impose major Chinese tariffs on China.

As Trump sees it, Taiwan, like Ukraine, is a sideshow when it comes to the relationship between the great powers; and he has refrained from proclaiming that the US would come to Taipei’s aid in the event of a Chinese invasion.

In a way, the concept of a US-China condominium could manifest itself in the event of a crisis between the United States and China over Taiwan. Both countries have an interest in avoiding direct military conflict, much like America and the Soviet Union did in 1962, which could include a possible nuclear confrontation.

In the long run, that kind of arrangement could create incentives for the evolution of a more stable balance-of-power system in the Indo-Pacific region, and avert a military conflict between the two regional giants.