Despite de-escalation, tensions between Iran and Israel remain high

IRAN and Israel backed away from the precipice last week, avoiding a full-blown military confrontation that could have ignited a dangerous regional war. Such a war, in turn, could have threatened the interests of the United States, Europe and the Gulf nations, increased energy prices, and devastated the global economy.

On Friday (Apr 19), Israel launched a limited military strike against Iran, in retaliation for Iran’s broader missile and drone assault earlier in the week. Iran’s own attack amounted to a retaliation for an earlier Israeli strike in Damascus that killed eight Iranian officers.

Israel’s strike on Friday, near the city of Isfahan, caused no serious damage.

It was downplayed by both sides, neither of which seems to have an interest in going to war.

The Israeli government has been under intense pressure from the US to show restraint in its response, even as it continues its war against Hamas in Gaza.

But it would be a mistake to assume that Friday’s stand-down signals a return to the long-running “shadow war” that existed between both sides before Iran’s attack last week.

Instead, last week’s developments marked a major change in the relationship between the two countries. Both sides have made it clear that they are ready to directly attack each other’s territory instead of operating from the shadows.

Direct danger

The problem is that, by exchanging direct fire, the two governments have changed the rules of the game without subscribing to new ones.

This could mean that the region is entering into a dangerous period, where a miscalculation on either side could lead to fresh escalation and engulf the region in a major war.

In a sense, both countries have already been engaged in military conflict after Hamas – seen as one of Iran’s regional proxies – attacked Israel on Oct 7, resulting in the Israeli offensive in Gaza. Iran has since activated its other proxies in the region – Hizbollah in Lebanon and the Houthis in Yemen – to launch attacks against Israel as well as against Western targets.

In broader terms, Iran hoped that the Hamas attack would challenge the balance of power in the region and erode American influence in the Middle East.

Teheran also aimed to sabotage US efforts to promote an Israeli-Saudi detente, which could have helped establish a pro-American Arab-Israeli alliance to contain Teheran.

In the long run, by using its militia network, Iran hopes to drive the US – Israel’s major global protector – from the region.

Moreover, the Iranian challenge to US regional hegemony plays directly into the hands of America’s global rivals, Russia and China. Both countries have maintained close diplomatic and economic ties with Iran and have condemned the Israeli military operation in Gaza.

The US has responded by arming Israel and providing it with diplomatic support. In fact, news reports suggest that the US is considering more than US$1 billion in new weapons deals for Israel.

No less significantly, the US and its allies helped Israel shoot down nearly all the 300 or so missiles and drones that came from Iran last week.

Since then, the US has also vetoed a UN Security Council resolution calling for the creation of a Palestinian state.

A balancing act

The Biden administration has been engaged in a very delicate balancing act.

On the one hand, it would like to see Israel defeat Hamas and, in the process, counter the Iranian challenge to America’s regional power.

On the other hand, the US wants to end the war in Gaza, which has already resulted in the death of more than 34,000 Palestinians and ignited anti-American sentiments in the Arab world.

The US goal is to achieve a ceasefire in Gaza as part of a broader regional settlement that includes normalisation of relations between Saudi Arabia and Israel, and the establishment of an independent Palestinian state in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank.

As part of this, Saudi Arabia and the other Arab-Sunni states would help maintain order in Gaza and invest in its economic reconstruction.

But Iran and its regional partners are likely to take steps to disrupt this American grand plan. Teheran recognises America’s major weakness in this conflict: its reluctance to be drawn into a military confrontation with Iran, in general, and during a presidential election year, in particular.

Until last week, the chances of a direct US-Iran military confrontation were low. The US could still take military action against some of Iran’s proxies – such as the Houthis in Yemen – or support Israel in its war against Hamas, without risking a direct clash with Iranian forces.

But now that Iran is sending a clear message that it is willing to risk a direct military confrontation with Israel, the danger is that in such a war, the US would be forced to fight on Israel’s side.

To put it another way: last week, the US was able to help Israel counter Iran’s attack without confronting the Iranian air force or ground troops.

That would become more difficult if, say, Iranian planes attack Tel Aviv, leaving the US no choice but to come to Israel’s aid.

That is the nightmare scenario that is haunting American policymakers and which they hope to avert.

But under the new conditions created in the region, they may not be able to avoid it forever.