The Greenland crisis is a warning for East Asia

THE Greenland crisis represents far more than a transatlantic dispute. For US allies in East Asia – Japan, South Korea and Taiwan – President Donald Trump’s territorial ambitions provide evidence that they can no longer rely on the US for protection. What began as outlandish claims have evolved into hybrid warfare against a Nato ally, destabilising the rules-based order underpinning Asian security.

During his second presidency, Trump has moved from offering to buy Greenland to threatening annexation. In January 2026, Trump announced 10 per cent tariffs on eight European countries, threatening an increase to 25 per cent unless Denmark sells Greenland.

Trump’s justifications for Greenland – strategic location, critical minerals and Arctic access – mirror Beijing’s arguments regarding Taiwan: semiconductor dominance, strategic positioning in the first island chain and Western Pacific access.

By threatening Denmark, a democratic ally, for strategic gain, the US has effectively undermined its own moral authority to oppose Chinese expansionism.

Eroding “rings of steel”

For East Asian allies, the Greenland crisis reveals a fundamental shift in how the US approaches alliance commitments. Historian Alfred McCoy noted that the US won the Cold War by encircling Eurasia with “rings of steel” – naval armadas, aircraft and military alliances with Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines and Australia. Trump is now dismantling these rings.

The timing is particularly consequential. The region already experiences heightened tensions, with Japan Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi stating that Chinese military action on Taiwan would amount to a “survival-threatening situation”, triggering a diplomatic crisis with China.

In this fraught environment, South Korea President Lee Jae-myung said the country would not take sides between China and Japan, offering to “play a role in mediating and coordination”.

However, the Greenland crisis complicates this balancing act. If the US cannot be relied upon to respect European allies’ territorial integrity, South Korea must reconsider whether US security guarantees remain credible against North Korean threats or Chinese pressure.

Strategic implications

The Greenland crisis may thus reshape the East Asian strategic calculus in several ways.

• Nuclear hedging: The erosion of US credibility may accelerate discussions in Japan and South Korea about independent nuclear deterrents. While politically fraught, the logic becomes compelling when the US demonstrates willingness to abandon alliance principles.
• Regional cooperation: The crisis may paradoxically strengthen intra-Asian cooperation as countries seek alternatives to sole reliance on American security guarantees. Enhanced trilateral cooperation between Japan, South Korea, and even rapprochement with China may become more attractive.
• Defence autonomy: Expect increased defence spending and indigenous capability development. Japan’s defence build-up will likely accelerate, while South Korea may reconsider its military strategy to account for reduced American reliability.
• Economic diversification: Markets understand that when trade flows remain open and rules-based, Asia benefits most. This will drive efforts to reduce dependence on Western markets and accelerate regional economic integration.

The Arctic-Pacific connection

Arctic shipping routes and security connect directly to trade planning. China views the Arctic as commercially relevant, while Japan and South Korea depend on uninterrupted maritime trade.

The Greenland crisis then also represents a direct challenge to the maritime order East Asian economies depend upon. If territorial disputes and coercive diplomacy become normalised in Arctic waters, similar dynamics could emerge in the South China Sea and East China Sea.

A moment of reckoning

With gold hitting record highs and global equities falling, markets currently show they believe escalation over Greenland is possible and are pricing in the instability. East Asian policymakers would be wise to do the same. This means planning for a world where American commitments cannot be taken for granted.

The post-World War II security architecture that brought unprecedented peace and prosperity to East Asia was built on credible US commitments to defend allies and uphold international law. That foundation is crumbling in the North Atlantic.

The question facing Tokyo, Seoul and Taipei now is no longer if the US will defend them against aggression, but whether they can stake their survival on a partner who threatens to annex allies. The answer emerging from the frozen waters around Greenland appears increasingly clear: they cannot.