It’s the culture, stupid

THE rise of the populist right in the West, demonstrated most recently by the impressive success of the far-right political parties in the election to the European Parliament, has led political scientists and journalists to once again try to explain this phenomenon.

According to conventional wisdom these political developments that have led, among other things, to Brexit and the election of Donald Trump in 2016 reflect the growing disenchantment among members of the middle class in Western Europe and North America with the social-economic effects of globalisation.

In a nutshell, the collapse of the manufacturing sectors in Western economies like the United States, France and Germany, resulting from the growing competition with China and other emerging economies, and leading to rising unemployment and lower standards of living, has produced rising discontent with the reigning political and economic elites. That in turn manifested itself in the electoral success of Trumpism and other populist and nationalist movements.

This theory, blaming what pundits refer to as “neo-liberalism” for the political earthquakes that shook the US and Britain and which may now lead perhaps to the election of far-right politician Marine Le Pen as the next president of France, sounds very appealing.

And although the “It’s-Neoliberalism-Stupid!” thesis does make some sense, it fails to clarify why, as many studies have suggested, both the rise of Donald Trump or, for that matter, the success of Le Pen’s National Rally or of the right-wing AfD, have been supported by well-to-do members of the middle class in the US, France and Germany respectively.

In fact, populist and nationalist parties have been doing well in areas in Europe that are considered to be economic success stories, including Poland and Hungary, Scotland, Catalonia and northern Italy.

At the same time, while it is true that Candidate Trump enjoys the backing of many working-class Americans and residents of poor rural areas, his electoral success would have not been possible without the support that he enjoys among many middle-class voters who have done well economically in recent years.

In a way, populism, and in particular, nationalism, may at its core be a political-cultural – and not a social-economic – phenomenon.

More specifically, American and European voters are responding to the way that illegal and legal immigration, especially from Third World countries, has been affecting their societies.

Indeed, the arrival of migrants from the Muslim Middle East and Africa to Europe, and the continuing stream of illegal immigrants from Mexico and Central America into the US, have created a sense of national insecurity among many White Americans and Europeans.

The latter see the social-cultural makeup of their countries being transformed by people who do not “look like us” and who are challenging the national identity of their societies.

To put it differently, the new immigrants are forcing Americans and Europeans to ask themselves “Who we are?” or what it means to be an American, a French, a German or an Italian these days.

Unfortunately, whether it’s Trumpism in the US, Le Pen in France or the AfD in Germany, voters in these countries seem to be rejecting the agendas promoted by centrist political parties and are attracted to the xenophobic answers provided by right-wing demagogues who are now winning elections.