Laughter, loopholes, liberation, and the Vietnam peace pact
THE Paris Peace Accords – the agreement to end the Vietnam War – must be remembered for its bizarre humour during the negotiations, the puzzling “loopholes” in its clauses, and the oddity that fighting continued for another two years.
This January marked the 50th anniversary of its signing in 1973, offering a moment to reflect on these “atmospherics”, as described by Henry Kissinger, former national security advisor to the US president.
Not too long ago, when I was conducting research in the US National Archives in College Park, Maryland, I came across several documents that showed American and North Vietnamese negotiators in Paris freely making jokes as they finalised the agreement’s clauses.
In the middle of a session on Oct 10, 1972, the chief North Vietnamese negotiator Le Duc Tho requested Kissinger to include a promise in the draft agreement, that the US would not continue its military involvement in Vietnam after the agreement was signed. Tho also asked Kissinger to delete a clause that would allow the US to keep its troops in Vietnam for 60 days after the ceasefire took effect.
Kissinger replied: “You won’t let us interfere for 60 days more?”
The participants broke into laughter. After that subsided, Tho retorted: “So you want to continue to interfere for 60 days more?”
Kissinger responded: “It is a habit that is so hard to break.”
More laughter erupted, then Tho brought the proceedings back to seriousness: “Once the war is ended, this should not be so.”
It is most interesting that the notetakers at the peace talks made mention of negotiators laughing in the minutes of meetings. (For readers wishing to know more, these documents are stored under the Nixon Presidential Materials, Henry A Kissinger Office Files, Country Files – Far East – Vietnam, Box 122).
Beneath the humour lay the larger issue of US imperialist expansionism and its military expeditions abroad that had, by Kissinger’s words, become a “habit” that was hard to break. But above all, the episode shows that the negotiators on both sides were polished, urbane men who employed humour to break the ice and build rapport. That was not all. The North Vietnamese also used humour to demonstrate their resistance to American power during the peace talks from 1970 to 1972.
North Vietnamese negotiators lost some of their cheer when the war was not going well for them. President Richard Nixon’s policy of Vietnamisation, under which increasing numbers of well-trained South Vietnamese troops replaced American troops that were being withdrawn, had not only placed Hanoi at a disadvantage and impaired its ability to make war in the south, but also made it plain that the US was using military pressure to negotiate from a position of strength. North Vietnam also blamed the US for engineering the coup against Prince Norodom Sihanouk of Cambodia in March 1970 that removed Hanoi’s main regional ally from power.
On Feb 21, 1970 in Paris, when the negotiators discussed the schedule for future meetings, their conversation turned into youthful banter. North Vietnamese negotiator Xuan Thuy suggested that if Kissinger fixed a date, the Hanoi side would arrange the agenda.
Kissinger quipped: “My absence from Washington is very noticeable. We would prefer Sunday to Saturday,” adding: “If I leave on Sunday, everyone will think I have a girl.”
Thuy helpfully offered: “Leave the girl somewhere, and come here for the discussions… this is a suggestion of goodwill.”
To which Kissinger responded, “As always, the minister has left out the essential element. First, I need a girlfriend.”
Thuy suggested, “Look for one. I am told you have many.”
It is remarkable that Thuy could be jocular because the battlefield reality was unfavourable to the communist revolution in the south. In addition to the pressures of Vietnamisation, the US and its South Vietnamese allies had prevented expansion of areas “liberated” by Hanoi-led forces in the south, including the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam.
As they settled down for talks on Oct 8, 1972, Kissinger aimed a joke at Tho and Thuy: “Did I force you to go to early mass this morning?”
There was laughter around the table at Kissinger’s suggestion that communists were becoming religious.
Kissinger added: “I am responsible then for any inadequacies in the salvation of your soul.”
Tho responded: “But Christ would like peace too, and not war.”
Kissinger asked if Thuy would have liked to see the horse race in Paris that day. He remarked that when the riders “get around the other side they’re behind the trees so you can’t see them, and I’m told that that’s where the jockeys decide who will win”. The conversation after proceeded as follows:
Tho: “But we, are we making now a race to peace or to war?”
Kissinger: “To peace, and we are behind the trees!”
Tho: “But shall we overcome those trees or shall we be hindered by these trees?”
Kissinger: “No, we will settle.”
Kissinger’s use of horse-racing imagery likened the peace talks to a two-horse race that was now in its final climactic moments, a race that both sides would lose if they failed to reach an agreement.
As a draft agreement neared its final shape, at the same session on Oct 8, 1972 in Paris, discussions focused on the longstanding sticking point of North Vietnamese military troops’ continuing presence in South Vietnam. Aware of Hanoi’s determination to maintain a troop presence in the south even after an agreement was signed, US negotiators conceded that they had “not asked for the withdrawal of all your forces”. It was an extraordinary concession from the Nixon administration, an admission that it had all but lost the war, and that there was nothing it could do to stop Hanoi from eventually taking control of the south.
Kissinger said: “We don’t want to write it (these details on troop presence and movement) into the agreement.”
By leaving the agreement vague, Kissinger deliberately created a “loophole” that paved the way for North Vietnam to retain its fighting forces in the south.
Kissinger even found humour in this serious matter: “If we can’t find every (North Vietnamese) tank we are not likely to find every soldier.”
Everybody laughed, and Tho rejoined: “You can’t find them because all of them are Vietnamese.”
More laughter ensued. Tho’s comment made clear that there was no difference between a northern and a southern soldier, that they were both Vietnamese, and that the division between north and south was artificially created by French and American imperial powers in order to control the country.
And so, on Jan 27, 1973, the two sides signed a peace agreement in Paris. South Vietnamese leaders felt a sense of betrayal by their American allies. They had not participated in the peace talks, and now they were left on their own. Unchallenged, North Vietnamese forces captured major cities in the central and southern regions, setting the stage for the fall of Saigon on Apr 30, 1975.
Against all odds, Vietnam has succeeded in building its economy, which last year grew at its fastest pace since 1997 – at 8 per cent – exceeding forecasts by the International Monetary Fund and World Bank, according to the Vietnamese government.
The lessons of the conflict are clear. In its long imperialist intervention in Vietnam, the US government diverged from its own ideals of peace and democracy. American presidents Lyndon Johnson and Nixon should not have bombed a defenceless Vietnam in a war that killed millions. In 1995, Vietnam said that two million of its people perished during the Vietnam War.
A lasting memory is that, in true guerrilla fashion, the North Vietnamese laughed and joked during peace negotiations and exploited the “loopholes”, on the way to liberating their country.
The writer is editor-in-chief of Rising Asia Journal.
Decoding Asia newsletter: your guide to navigating Asia in a new global order. Sign up here to get Decoding Asia newsletter. Delivered to your inbox. Free.
Copyright SPH Media. All rights reserved.
