Post-internationalist America: Isolationists, progressives changing US foreign policy direction

BORN in 1942 in the midst of World War II, US President Joe Biden grew up as a kid in the first years of the Cold War.

And he has been a foreign-policy bridge of sorts linking the generation that established the foundations of the post-1945 international system and the American leaders who presided over the end of the Cold War.

Like his Democratic and Republican predecessors who led the United States in the aftermath of the 1991 collapse of the Soviet Union, President Biden’s approach to global affairs reflects both the changing international balance of power and the evolving sentiments of the American people.

On one hand, Biden attempted to maintain the post-World War II liberal international order aka Pax Americana despite the gradual erosion of American global economic and military power and the surge of a new competitor, China; a resurgence of an old rival, Russia; and the challenges from rogue states such as Iran, North Korea and Venezuela.

And he tried to do all that at a time when there were clear signs that in the aftermath of the military fiascos in Afghanistan and Iraq, Americans had become reluctant to support new US military interventions abroad.

And following the 2007-2008 global financial crisis and against the backdrop of the decline of America’s manufacturing sector and the economic-social pressures on America’s middle class and rising economic competition with China, the American public was not in the mood to endorse new ambitious trade liberalisation agreements.

Indeed, the election of Republican Donald Trump in 2016 marked in part these changes: an America less inclined to engage in costly military ventures around the world and less supportive of a liberalising trade agenda.

Hence the rise of President Trump and Trumpism reflected America’s isolationist, protectionist and, to some extent, xenophobic backlash and raised the prospects of an America that is less willing to commit its diplomatic, military and economic resources to lead the West against the challenges facing it and to serve in the role of the “indispensable nation”.

The election of Democratic President Joe Biden in 2020 seemed at first to challenge these assumptions, with a self-proclaimed internationalist – who had served four decades in Washington promoting a multilateral foreign policy centred on global security alliances and advancing free trade agreements – now highlighting the need for democratic nations led by the US to stand up to the world’s autocracies.

And, indeed, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022 provided Biden the opportunity to project his internationalist approach, bringing together the Western alliance to face the Russian aggression, by imposing punishing economic measures on Moscow, assisting Ukraine with military and economic aid, and re-energising Nato, which even added two new members.

But when it came to the international liberal trade agenda, Biden proved to be as Trumpist as Trump, launching aggressive economic warfare against China and, in response to pressure from labour unions and the Democratic Party’s progressive wing, embracing America-First protectionist measures that excluded the possibility of new trade deals.

From that perspective, it is likely that Vice-President Kamala Harris – who has emerged as Biden’s heir apparent and who maintains close political ties with the progressives in her party – would, if elected as president, continue to pursue a restrictive trade agenda, perhaps centred on green tariffs.

The Democratic Party’s progressives also tend to be critical of Biden’s military interventionist policies, and in particular of his support for Israel during the war in Gaza, and his efforts to sign a security agreement with Saudi Arabia. Hence, expect a President Harris to reflect that more-reserved approach regarding America’s Middle East policy.

And just as the progressives will exert more influence on American foreign policy in the post-Biden era under a President Harris, the isolationists would be in charge under a President Trump who has been critical of Biden’s support for Ukraine and is committed to ending it and to pressing Kyiv to reach a peace deal with Moscow.

Former president Trump has also repeatedy threatened to reassess US global military commitments, and in particular its membership in Nato.

This raises the prospect of a crisis in the relationship with America’s transatlantic allies.

And then there is Trump’s aggressive protectionist agenda that, among other things, calls for imposing 10 per cent duties on all foreign imports and embracing a tougher approach vis-a-vis America’s trade partners and rivals.

That Trump selected Senator JD Vance – who is one of the most vocal protectionists and isolationists in the Republican Party – suggests that the balance of power inside the Republican Party, once known for embracing internationalist principles, has shifted in the direction of those who want the US to pursue nationalist policies and unilateralist strategies under which the allies’ concerns become secondary at best.

In that context, the realpolitik strategy advanced by the Trump-Vance team would not exclude making deals with autocrats such as Russia’s Vladimir Putin and would dismiss the notion that the US’ role is to promote democratic ideas worldwide.

America’s allies around the world have therefore to prepare themselves that under a President Trump or a President Harris in 2025, they would be facing a less internationalist America, more concerned with its economic challenges at home and less prepared to use its military power to resolve conflicts or to open its markets to foreign competition. An America less willing, overall, to serve in the global role of the “indispensable nation”.