Trump 2.0 and the Middle East
Unlike during the first Trump administration, the US is now facing geostrategic challenges in the region
AS DONALD Trump commences his second term in office come January, it is clear that when it comes to the Middle East, the geostrategic map as well as the balance of power in the region have shifted, as did American global and regional priorities.
On a geostrategic level, while Trump was away, the Second Cold War commenced with Russia’s attack on Ukraine in February 2022; an alliance of convenience between Moscow and Beijing has been formed, to which North Korea and Iran have linked their interests in what some refer to as the axis of upheaval or the quartet of chaos, also known as Crink.
Against the backdrop of the contest with China, two regional wars in Ukraine and in the Middle East, and the challenges posed to US and Western interests by Crink and their satellites, America is now diplomatically and militarily overstretched and has spread its resources on three fronts – East Asia, Europe and the Middle East.
At the same time, growing military ties between Russia and Iran, and expanding Chinese involvement in the Middle East through Beijing’s economic ties to Riyadh and Tehran and diplomatic action, suggest that unlike during the first Trump administration, the United States is now facing geostrategic challenges in the region.
Washington’s ability to maintain Pax Americana in the Middle East is eroding just as its geostrategic power is being tested in Ukraine by Russia, in the South China Sea by China, and in the Middle East by Iran.
Israel’s response to the Oct 7, 2023 attack has weakened the ability of Iran to assert its position in the Middle East. In the short run, relying on US support, including US$18 billion in military aid, Israel has succeeded in diminishing the power of both Hamas and Hizbollah, emerging as the leading military power in the Levant, and has responded effectively to Iran’s attack against it.
A stretched military
But the Oct 7 attack and its aftermath exposed the reality of the overstretching of the American military as the US was forced, for example, to move its team of aircraft carriers from East Asia to the Middle East and back.
Moreover, while Iran may have failed to overwhelm Israel, its show of force and that of its regional proxies through, for example, the threat that Yemen’s Houthis posed to international shipping, shattered the sense of American hegemony in the region.
The bottom line is that the Iranian leaders recognise that public and congressional opposition to the idea of another direct military US intervention in the Middle East would make it difficult for the United States to use military force against the regime in Tehran – and certainly close to impossible to orchestrate a regime change there.
But then, as Iran continues to pursue its efforts to acquire nuclear weapons (having now enriched uranium to 60 per cent purity, a hair’s breadth from nuclear weapons-grade), the question is whether the US would be forced to use its military power against Iran’s nuclear installations or give Israel the green light to do so.
The conventional wisdom in Washington and Middle Eastern capitals is that unlike President Joe Biden, who projected occasional displeasure with Benjamin Netanyahu’s government over its conduct in Gaza and the West Bank, the Trump administration is unlikely to object to any Israeli violations on the ground.
But then president-elect Trump also vowed to end the wars in Gaza and Ukraine, suggesting that he may be impatient with the financial costs of war for the US and the risks of possible American casualties, as well as the concern that continuing war in the Middle East would divert attention from his domestic and foreign policy priorities.
When it comes to Iran, the expectation is that president-elect Trump appears prepared to push Iran even harder than he did during his first term.
Indeed, the president has vowed to ratchet up economic pressure on Tehran once again, suggesting that the new administration will likely exert far less restraint than the Biden team on Israel’s campaign to degrade Iran and its proxies’ capabilities.
But the Trump administration may have trouble replicating the success of its first sanctions campaign, which relied on the willingness of major powers such as Russia and China to abide by them. This time around, the two powers are likely to be opposed to sanctioning Iran and may even support Tehran in its clash with the United States.
At the same time, Saudi Arabia and the other Arab Gulf states have been pursuing a policy of detente with Iran and are opposed to toughening the US position vis-a-vis Tehran, which might lead to instability in the region and threaten their interests.
Trump has promised during his election campaign not to allow Iran to build a nuclear bomb, but seemed unenthusiastic about a war with Iran. “I don’t want to do damage to Iran,” he said in November, adding that he wanted Iran to be a “successful country”.
There are some indications that the new Trump administration may be hesitant about a confrontation with Iran and would reject Israeli pressure to up the ante.
In an interview in October, Trump’s running mate JD Vance explained that Israel and the United States may sometimes have divergent interests, but “our interest very much is in not going to war with Iran”.
Project 2025, a conservative blueprint for Trump’s second term, calls for sanctions on Iran, but stops short of recommending military action. Instead, it argues that America’s Arab allies should do more to protect themselves from Iranian threats.
Push for two-state solution
Hence, contrary to the expectation that the new Trump administration may adopt an “Israel First” agenda that would, say, allow Israel to annex the West Bank and embrace an aggressive approach vis-a-vis Iran, president Trump may decide to press the Israelis to agree to commit themselves to the two-state solution.
That might actually increase the chances for an Israeli-Saudi detente and the realisation of the first Trump administration’s goal of establishing an axis of Arab states and Israel that would help contain Iran, in addition to taking steps to politically stabilise and economically reconstruct the Gaza Strip.
Similarly, Trump may decide that since his “maximum pressure” policy on Iran didn’t work in Trump 1.0, perhaps he should consider a new Iran policy in Trump 2.0 that could perhaps lead to a deal with Iran, the kind that Trump likes to make.
The goals of such a deal could include stricter limits on nuclear work and a pledge from Iran that it would limit its missile development programme, and stop backing regional militias, and the prospect of normal ties with America.
The prospect of security in the Middle East that would be achieved through a US deal with Iran, normalisation of relations between Saudi Arabia and Israel, and the establishment of an Arab-Israeli security partnership, would free America to focus on Asia.